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C
Appendix C - Transcript
Committee met at 9.03 am
Session 1: Reflections on a decade
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. I would like to welcome you to this seminar. Seminars do play a
very important role in the work of the parliament. It is not an opportunity for
navel gazing for us, to look back on what we have done, but it is really an
opportunity to have an interaction with people who have an interest in
treaties—people from overseas, people from academe, people from the state
and territory parliaments, people from the diplomatic corps and other
interested members of parliament. I have always found that they are very
useful in enhancing the working of parliament in looking critically and
reflectively on the work that we do.
A PowerPoint presentation was then given—
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—This slide shows a scientific research
balloon. Some of these balloons are inflated to the size of the MCG. The
coating of this balloon is as about as thick as a piece of gladwrap and it carries
a payload which is two to three tonnes. These balloons are launched from
Alice Springs by NASA. They travel around the earth at 40 kilometres an
hour. They usually make one circuit of the earth and then they are brought
down, either by a radio control or by a pressure signal. When it becomes too
low, they are brought down somewhere near Alice Springs.
The reason I raise this is just to give a taste of some of the issues that we get
to consider in the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. It is not all ANZUS,
Triple Alliance, Triple Entente and that sort of thing. There is an enormous
range of treaties that we consider. There is a bilateral agreement between
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Australia and the United States governing the use of these balloons. The tests
are conducted by NASA and they are used for research. NASA have made a
number of observations from these scientific research balloons, which are
much cheaper than launching satellites.
This slide gives a breakdown of the topics that the treaties committee has
considered over the last 10 years. As you can see, it is a very broad range of
things—transport, the environment, security issues, health and human
services. This slide shows how we have broken it down. This information is in
your materials. This also gives you an idea of the number of treaty actions
that have been tabled and whether they are multilateral or bilateral. As you
can see, it is a fairly regular workload month by month. We have been
producing one to two reports per month. The next slide shows the number of
treaties that have been reviewed year by year.
The idea of parliamentary scrutiny of treaties is not new. In the 1960s it was
the convention that treaties be tabled for 12 days before any binding action
was taken. There was no provision for debate. That convention fell into disuse
and it became the practice that batches of treaties were tabled every six
months, sometimes after they had already entered into binding action. There
was a period in the 1990s when there were a number of treaties that Australia
entered into that elicited a lot of public reaction and public comment. The
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee produced a very
important report, Trick or treaty, which led to a number of treaty reforms. The
secretary of that committee, Anne Twomey, is here today and she will be
speaking to us later.
There were two areas for those reforms. Firstly, there was a provision for
greater consultation with the states, because, as we know, treaties can impose
obligations on the states and territories and sometimes can require changes to
state and territory legislation to enter into force. The principal body
established for this was the Standing Committee on Treaties. We look forward
to hearing from Petrice Judge from the standing committee on treaties a little
later. Secondly, there was the parliamentary scrutiny of treaty actions. Since
1996, treaty actions have been tabled in both houses of parliament. Generally,
bilateral treaties are tabled after signature and prior to binding treaty action
being taken and multilateral treaties may be tabled at any stage before
binding action is taken once the treaty text is finalised.
The treaties are divided into two categories. We have category 1 treaties,
which are ones that are likely to have a lot of public interest, ones of major
political, economic or social significance. They lie on the table for at least 20
sitting days. Then we have category 2 treaties, which for the most part are
uncontroversial and routine and are tabled for 15 sitting days. All treaties are
automatically referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. A key
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document is the national interest analysis, which is prepared by the
sponsoring department. This document sets out the reasons why Australia
should enter into these treaties and what consultations have been carried out
and so on.
JSCOT consists of 16 members: nine members of the government and seven
members from non-government parties, which is composed of six from the
Labor Party and, currently, the Democrat senator Andrew Bartlett. This has
been something of an issue. When the United States free trade agreement was
announced, we thought, ‘Great! We’re going to be doing the inquiry.’ And we
did, but the then leader of the opposition thought that we needed a Senate
committee to look at this as well. Originally he proposed a Senate committee
with five non-government members and two government members. Then
later the Senate committee had five non-government members and three
government members. In the end the report which I think had the greater
weight was the one from the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. JSCOT
has the power to call for witnesses to attend public hearings and for
documents to be produced. Although we meet mostly in Canberra, the
committee may meet anywhere in Australia—for example, on the AustraliaUS free trade agreement, we travelled to all capital cities over a period of two
weeks to get a wide range of views.
Once the treaties are tabled, the clock starts ticking. The committee has only
the specified 15 or 20 sitting days to complete its report. I should say that 20
sitting days often in practice works out to about three months in the calendar.
Our first step is to advertise in the Australian, inviting submissions from
anyone who may be interested in a particular treaty. Some of those making
submissions may be invited to give oral evidence but, in all cases, officials
from the sponsoring departments are called before the committee. We are
always keen to receive further submissions. One thing that we do find, when
the consultation has been done well by the departments and the stakeholders
are satisfied with the result, is that most do not want to make a further
submission to the treaty. But we do try to say, ‘Can you give us your opinion?
What do you think?’ and so on. We try to elicit submissions through media
releases, going on radio and writing to stakeholder groups, encouraging them
to make a submission or to give their opinion on whether Australia should
ratify the treaty.
A recent example is when we were looking at the exclusive economic zone
between Australia and New Zealand. It seemed fairly straightforward.
Australia and New Zealand had both agreed on it. We were told that Norfolk
Island was generally satisfied but we still wrote to the Chief Minister and the
Norfolk Island Legislative Assembly trying to get their views. We held up the
report until we had heard from them and made sure that we had got all the
evidence we could. Our reports recommend that the government either take
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or not take binding treaty action. The committee can also recommend that a
treaty be entered into subject to certain conditions. It is open for dissenting
members to write a report, which is tabled with the committee’s report. Even
so, most of the proceedings of the committee are conducted in a bipartisan
spirit.
With the tabling of the report, the committee’s involvement in the progress
of the proposed treaty action ends, although it is open to us to look at any
treaty which we are either proposing to enter into or are a party to. The
government considers the committee’s findings and, where the committee has
recommended that binding treaty action be taken, moves towards ratifying
and implementing the treaty. If the committee has made any other
recommendations, the government responds formally to the committee’s
recommendations by tabling a government response in the House. It should
be noted that the committee’s recommendations are advisory. The
government is not bound by them. But it is fair to say that the government has
taken the committee’s recommendations into account throughout the period
from 1996.
Since 1996 the committee has tabled recommendations on 365 proposed
treaty actions in 72 reports, which works out at one treaty every 10 days. The
committee is currently in the process of reviewing a further 16 treaties. This
year the inquiry that will probably have the most public interest is the treaty
with East Timor on certain maritime arrangements in the Timor Sea. It was
signed on 12 January this year, but has not yet been tabled.
I will give you an idea of the things we look at. I mentioned the scientific
research balloons and agreement between Australia and the United States.
There is an optical telescope at Siding Spring, which is the result of a bilateral
agreement between Australia and the United Kingdom. We have recently
considered an agreement with Singapore, extending another five-year term on
the use of the Shoalwater Bay training area, which the Singapore defence
force uses for training. The Treaties Committee has previously considered a
similar treaty with Singapore on Oakey where they train with their
helicopters. We have recently tabled a report on a prisoner transfer agreement
with Hong Kong. We looked at the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,
which was a condition of Australia becoming part of the East Asia Summit.
We have looked at the WHO framework convention on tobacco control, the
joint regulatory scheme for therapeutics with New Zealand, the issue of police
and assistance to Nauru—Australian police and Australian finance officials
going to Nauru. That gives you an idea of the spread of issues we consider.
When we were looking at the United States free trade agreement it was not
unusual to go from considering intellectual property and copyright law to
local content rules for broadcasting to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme to
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Australia’s quarantine arrangements all in the one day. We would look at
quotas—we considered the intricacies of quotas for beef, sugar and even
peanuts. In that inquiry, we received over 200 submissions and we held
public hearings in Sydney—for two days—Melbourne, Hobart, Adelaide,
Perth and Brisbane. The draft text was tabled early to allow us to get the
report done before the election that year. We had three months from the
tabling of a draft text to tabling our report, and then parliament debate on the
legislation came about.
As with the report on the International Criminal Court, having the report
and all the public submissions available did help the subsequent process,
which you might remember involved the Prime Minister and the Leader of
the Opposition debating the intricacies of patent law, especially with respect
to pharmaceuticals. We had some people visiting from overseas and they
thought it was incredible to see the Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition getting really involved in the area of patent law. In the end that
was the issue on which hung the Labor Party support for the legislation to
pass through the parliament.
JSCOT has considered treaties which had enormous public interest and
divided views in the community—the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
and the International Criminal Court. It knocked back one treaty, the
Agreement on Economic and Commercial Cooperation with Kazakhstan in
1997 and, six years later, reluctantly recommended binding treaty action be
taken. The committee produced two reports on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment while it was being negotiated, and those reports were scathing.
Eventually the negotiations on that broke down.
Last year, in considering the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, the committee raised the interesting question as to whether this
conferred additional jurisdiction on the Commonwealth. The committee
considered, briefly, the scope of the external affairs power and how this was
constrained by express or implied constitutional limitations—again a treaty
which appeared fairly straightforward, something that everyone agreed
with—and looked at whether there were any unintended consequences.
The committee can be quite critical of national interest analyses if they do
not have enough information. We do criticise the introduction of legislation
before our report has been tabled, and we are prepared to delay the
consideration of a treaty if we require further information. We have made
recommendations on the use of the national interest exemption to allow for an
urgent briefing of the committee to be given in these cases. There have been a
couple of treaties—the one with Nauru and the Enhanced Cooperation
Program with Papua New Guinea, where the use of the national interest
exemption has been used. We have asked in those circumstances for an urgent
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briefing of the committee by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It really is for
others to determine what the impact and role of JSCOT have been.
In conclusion, what I have set out for you today is the way that Australia
has chosen to make the treaty making process more open and transparent.
However, a dedicated treaties committee is not the only way to go. All
parliaments do it differently. Some parliaments refer treaties to their foreign
affairs committees, others to specialist committees with expertise in relevant
portfolio areas. Others ratify them through the parliament. We will have the
opportunity this afternoon to gain some insights into the New Zealand
approach to treaties scrutiny from the chairperson of the select committee of
Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Diane Yates MP. We had hoped to hear
about the Indonesian process from Theo Sambuaga but, unfortunately, his
commitments as chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defence and Information
Policy Committee of the DPR have prevented him from being here today.
I would like to thank the committee secretariat and the committee secretary,
Gillian Gould, for their work in putting together the seminar, and also for the
important work they do in making sure that our regular work program flows
smoothly. It really is a logistic task. It is a matter of seeing all the treaties
going through the different pipes all come out at the right time. Every month
we have a new batch of treaties to be considered. The program before you
today has been designed to set out some of the issues surrounding the review
process and to stimulate thinking about future directions for the committee.
How can processes be improved? Are there any evident faults? I look forward
to the discussions and debate throughout that the day. Thank you.
We have three speakers on our panel and then we will have time for
questions. I introduce the Hon. Dick Adams. We thought it would be good to
hear from Dick today because he is the one with the corporate memory on this
committee, having been a member from 1996 to 2006. As some of you heard
last night, he has an interest in Tasmanian salmon and has never really
accepted the fact that that case was lost. Dick was a member of the Tasmanian
parliament before he was elected as the member for Lyons in 1993.
Mr Dick Adams MP—Thank you. It is great to be here and to be able to
reflect on 10 years on a parliamentary committee. It was rather strange when I
was approached to be on the committee, and I started to think about it. I
started to get interested in treaties because of my experience in the Tasmanian
parliament. I lost my seat, with four other cabinet ministers, over the Franklin
Dam issue. The power came from a treaty through to the High Court. There
was not a parliamentary committee of scrutiny so nobody understood this
treaty, how it came about and where it fell from. It was interesting to get here
10 years later and then some time after that to take a role on this committee. It
was good to be interested in and to scrutinise the making of treaties.
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I accept the fact that the executive has the power and needs to have the
power to make those treaties and to negotiate treaties but to have a scrutiny
process is very important. Probing executives these days is half of what
parliament should be about, whether it is state or federal.
There have been some interesting times going through this. I will mention
the experience with state issues. The states need to be a little more conscious
that treaties will continue to affect them and they will need to scrutinise the
process a little more than they do now. I will be interested to hear what Neil
has to say a little later. I have spent time in a state cabinet and then, over 10
years, I have listened to the treaty making process here. That is not a
deliberate approach. While the nation states are looking for their own
relevance in change, and states within states, powers can change and move
away. That is something. The Victorian parliament had a committee that
looked at federal-state relations, but I have not seen them for a while so I do
not know whether they are still in existence. They used to play a role there.
Things can go from scrutinising treaties to other issues. For example, in my
work as a member of parliament in my electorate this week I came across the
case of an Australian citizen whose eligibility as a New Zealand citizen
appears to have been inconsistent with a bilateral social security agreement
that we have just done, and it has changed the status of this person. He
thought he was an Australian citizen, and he is a permanent resident for the
purposes of the Australian Citizenship Act, but he failed to apply for a
determination to protect his status by a deadline set in the social security
arrangements of that treaty. The citizen was never advised, written to or
whatever, so how was he ever going to know that he had to apply for
something? This isolated an Australian resident who arrived in Australia
when he was six and always thought he was an Australian resident with dual
citizenship. Now he has a complex situation and is asking me to sort it out.
This is one of the issues that can happen.
However, overall the treaties committee is a good committee to be a part of,
because it deals with an enormous number of issues—and the chair went over
some of those, from the balloon that was in the PowerPoint presentation to
social security issues with New Zealand. I guess the most boring one is
double taxation. I think the tax department has somebody down in an office
who they pull out and bring before the committee to talk to us about double
taxation. He is a very boring speaker. He speaks in a monotone way, and it is
very hard to extract what the treaty is about. You know it is about double
taxation, but is somebody going to get an advantage? It is always difficult. So
we go from fun issues to sometimes a little boring issues. In the early days of
the committee, the Public Service and those who were starting to be
scrutinised, and who had never been scrutinised before, found that a little
difficult. I think they still do at times, but I think some of that has broken
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down over the years, and the responsibility and role of the committee has
been accepted.
The Pine Gap treaty with the US was an interesting issue. My role as a
member elected to the Australian parliament and sitting on the treaties
committee was to scrutinise this treaty and say that this treaty was good for
Australia, but I was not able to be briefed about what this treaty was about.
We highlighted a few issues there that needed to come forward. The main
issue was that an American senator or congressman can fly into Australia, go
to Pine Gap and get totally briefed on what the installation does, but an
Australian member of parliament on the treaties committee cannot get briefed
on what actually occurs at Pine Gap. I probably know what occurs at Pine
Gap and probably would not have a problem with it, but it is an issue that
still has not been resolved. Some of us on the Labor side brought down a
minority report to highlight that issue. It is still one we need to come to grips
with as a parliament.
Regarding other issues of complexity, we have the new family law bill in
the parliament now. That is complex enough, and enough issues come out of
that—child maintenance issues and everything else—but when you start
dealing with overseas issues things get even more complex. Unless you get
agreements that can really hold and unless two people make an agreement
that their kids are going to live in one country for so many months and in
Australia for the rest of the time, that is even more complex than one parent
living in Brisbane and the other in Hobart. Those issues are not easy, and you
need agreements that each country really holds to, otherwise things are just
going to fall away.
Extradition is a very interesting subject that came up. The committee did a
report on that and the issue of civil law versus common law. The AttorneyGeneral’s Department was before us just recently, and they are doing a report
on extradition to try and find methods to come through. We expect some
evidence to be given before an Australian citizen is taken out of Australia, but
that process is more difficult with countries that have civil law, where they
actually build up a case as they go along, and a magistrate runs those sorts of
cases.
I also sat on a very interesting subcommittee inquiry into some legislation
dealing with bribery in overseas countries. That was a very interesting thing
to be a part of, and again there were great complexities. Businesspeople come
before us to talk about how you cannot get the phone on unless you pay
somebody and how we were going to make legislation so that an Australian
company could not do that. It usually occurs by joint ventures and all sorts of
other ways are found. We did get legislation out of that. I think Australia now
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prohibits anybody bribing a politician or an official of another country to get a
contract or two.
We did a report on the World Trade Organisation called Who’s afraid of the
WTO? Well, a lot of people were afraid of the WTO, and probably some
people still are, but it was a way of opening up that debate a bit. I think the
treaties committee played a very good role in that. We took a lot of evidence
from a very diverse group of the Australian community.
In the early days, when the chair was Bill Taylor and there had been 13
years of Labor government, one of the concerns that brought this committee
was to do with the rights of the child, and there were a heck of a lot of myths
out there. This committee went round Australia taking some of that on board,
listening to some very interesting debate and discussion about what the
Convention on the Rights of the Child was really about. Of course it is really
about protecting children, but in a lot of people’s minds it was about a lot of
other things. The committee was able to absorb that and probably played an
educational role out there in the community. It was able to bring down a
report on that subject.
In the middle of the Hanson era, there was an issue to do with the
Singapore government’s helicopter facility at Oakey, which the chair
mentioned. We got some pretty interesting people talking to us about another
country having a sovereign base in Australia and trying to say that we were
going to destroy the whole country with that. It is interesting to go out and
get information and for the committee to be able to sit and listen to Australian
citizens and what they think about treaties. That is a very good role.
In knocking back the Kazakhstan treaty—the only one we have knocked
back—I think we were playing a diplomatic role. I think Telstra had done
about four years work there and then overnight they were told that they were
not going to get any other contracts because a deal had been done over dinner
the night before, which is not what we, as a country, accept should happen. I
think our diplomats were able to go back and say, ‘The treaty committee of
the Australian parliament has knocked back the treaty that we were going to
sign with you, so there you are—bingo.’ I think we probably played that role
in that case.
The US free trade agreement was an enormous exercise and the resources
on the committee were enormous. In that exercise, we wanted to be able to get
the information that came before us out for the public to see. Having a
secretariat working so hard on just producing the report that we had to
produce as our obligation to the parliament left no opportunities or resources
to be able to put all the submissions on the website so that the public could
get access to that and make their own conclusions and their own arguments
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ready for the public debate coming out of the parliamentary tabling or the
parliamentary debate. I think that is an issue that still needs to be dealt with.
As I said, these are broad issues which make it a very interesting committee
to be a part of. I have enjoyed the 10 years that I have spent on the committee.
Since 9-11, issues dealing with terrorism and so on continue to come before
us. Money laundering, port security and many other issues are, of course, on
the table and take a great deal of time and effort. I think we need more
opportunities to let more people speak on the reports. When we table the
reports it is usually the chair and the deputy chair in the House of
Representatives who speak, and it is probably similarly reflected in the
Senate. There are probably some reports that the committee brings down
which other people and other members of the parliament want to speak on.
We should have processes that allow that to happen, especially when we get
controversial reports.
As I said, the issue of information is very much a concern for me. We need
to make sure that all the information goes on the website so everybody has
access to it and can make their own conclusions. We need to look at that as a
parliamentary process and the committees need to be resourced properly so
that can happen. To finish up, one of the strange reports we brought down
was when we changed the treaty on boundaries with Indonesia, which is
always a bit contentious, especially around East Timor et cetera. I do not think
anybody had gone out to talk to the good Australian citizens of Christmas
Island. Christmas Island was going to become a bit closer to Indonesia and the
treaties committee was given the task of telling them. Under the then chair,
Bill Taylor, we flew out there and held a very good hearing. We had a couple
of nice days on Christmas Island, which I recommend to all of you. It is a very
pleasant place. The red crabs are worth having a look at—I understand they
are under a bit of a challenge at the moment. The good people there, even
though they moved a little bit closer to Indonesia—I think they are about 390
kilometres from Jakarta—when that boundary changed, accepted that in good
faith.
Overall, I think the processes that we have undertaken have made it a good
10 years. As the chairman said, one should always review these things. We
should always be looking at and probing for how we can make things better. I
think the parliament has been better for having a process of scrutinising these
treaties. I look forward to the next 10 years on the treaties committee,
scrutinising the treaties that the executive make.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Thank you very much, Dick. I would
now like to introduce Devika Hovell. Devika is a lecturer in law at the
University of New South Wales and director of the Gilbert and Tobin Centre
of Public Law. She has practised in both domestic and international law,
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working as an associate to Judge Hayne in the High Court and at the ICJ in
The Hague. She has also worked locally. For the last three years Devika has
been involved in a three-year project funded by the Australian Research
Council researching the relationship between international law and the
Australian legal system. Together with her project partners, Professor Hilary
Charlesworth, Professor George Williams and Madelaine Chiam, she has
published a number of articles and an edited collection on the issue. Their
forthcoming book, No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law, will
be published in May. It involves significant discussion and analysis of the
practice of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.
Ms Devika Hovell—I would like to pay special tribute to the past and
present members of JSCOT, whose 10-year anniversary we celebrate today,
and also to the hardworking staff of the secretariat—I often hear praise of
their work in the work that I have been doing over last three years. I will also
make a slight clarification: I am not the director of the Gilbert and Tobin
Centre. George Williams would be a little upset to hear that, especially since it
is now in Hansard. I am in fact the director of the International Law Project at
that centre.
According to the British constitutional tradition that Australia has inherited,
treaty making is the domain of the executive and not the parliament. The
power to conduct foreign relations, including the power to make treaties, is
one of the royal prerogatives retained by the Crown and carried out by the
executive branch, usually through the minister responsible for foreign affairs.
Since prerogative powers by definition provide the executive with the power
to act without parliament’s consent, treaty making, including treaty
ratification, is at common law a wholly executive act.
The 1996 reforms, the subject of today’s seminar, were introduced in
recognition that this constitutional tradition is a little outdated. The tradition
emerged in an era when international law was confined to a narrow set of
legal principles—and the fewer the better according to the laissez faire
ideology of the times—directed solely at regulating peaceful relations
between states. Even then, treaty obligations were entered into only by a
narrow subset of such states—namely, the set of civilised nations admitted to
that exclusive club—in an era when such obligations could be neglected
without serious consequence.
How times have changed. International law is no longer merely about
relations between states. It is just as likely to impact upon internal affairs and
individuals and corporations within states. The scope of international law
extends to such areas as investment, human rights, the environment, natural
resources, communications, education, science, transport, criminal law and
weather balloons. Treaties are a form of law—what is more, a form of
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permanent law that can affect corporations and individuals within a nation
for generations to come. In this context, a tradition vesting the task of treaty
making exclusively in the executive government can be seen as the product of
a bygone era, reflecting 19th century conceptions of international law and
governance in the area.
Dr Southcott referred to the three-year project I have been working on with
Professor Hilary Charlesworth, Madelaine Chiam and Professor George
Williams, with the funding of the Australian Research Council. This has been
looking at the relationship between international law and the Australian legal
system. Significantly though, it has involved research on the decision-making
process leading to the entry of treaties, and in the course of this I have been
privileged to interview former prime ministers, former and present attorneygenerals, the foreign affairs minister, departmental officers at federal and state
level, and members of parliamentary committees such as JSCOT. Through this
research, naturally, we formed views about the way in which Australia’s
political system works and does not work when it comes to treaty making.
Our broad conclusion is that it is no longer appropriate for the executive
government of the day to have untrammelled power to commit Australia to
new international obligations. Put simply, the tradition is undemocratic.
None of this is groundbreaking. Detractors have long spoken of a
democratic deficit existing in the business of treaty making, yet, like so many
of these buzz words, ‘democratic deficit’ is a term that creates more heat than
light. For the purpose of today’s discussion, I would like to work with sharper
tools. In assessing the 1996 reforms, I propose to be guided by three
standards. A survey of domestic systems reveals that democratisation of the
business of treaty making has largely been achieved using three mechanisms:
transparency, scrutiny and democratic accountability.
Undoubtedly the 1996 reforms have done much to increase the
transparency of treaty making. Public awareness and understanding of
treaties entered into by the Australian government has greatly increased. To
see this, one need only compare the Australian public’s understanding of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to its understanding of and
relationship to a treaty entered into before the passage of the reforms—the
optional protocol by which Australia accepted the jurisdiction of the United
Nations human rights committee.
It does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that failure to engender public
awareness of the optional protocol and to educate the public on the nature of
Australia’s relationship with the committee has detracted in the long-term
from the perception of the human rights committee as a legitimate assessor of
Australia’s human rights violations. Later governments have been able to
exploit the perceived illegitimacy of the committee by painting the
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international human rights framework as an unjustifiable intervention in
domestic affairs. Scrutiny of the human rights committee therefore took place
after Australia’s accession to the treaty instead of beforehand, and the
scrutiny has therefore been expressed in terms of noncompliance with the
treaty—an unsatisfactory solution.
Recognising the importance of the 1996 reforms for the transparency of
Australia’s treaty-making system, Canadian academic Joanna Harrington
marvels in a recent volume of the International and Comparative Law Quarterly:
... those from abroad envy the sheer volume of treaty-making information made public through
the JSCOT process ...

She also said that the dedicated efforts of those within and outside parliament
interested in scrutiny have done much to prevent this volume of material
from becoming overwhelming. On the other hand, as the slogan of the
academic goes, it is strongly arguable that the reforms have not gone far
enough. Australia may have made significant inroads into improving the
transparency of treaty making; however, there is still inadequate progress
along the road of scrutiny and democratic accountability in treaty making.
Canadian academics may marvel, for the tabling of treaties in the Canadian
parliament is only on an ad hoc basis and Canada has no permanent treaty
scrutiny body, but South African academics would not. South Africa, like
Australia, inherited the British practice of vesting sole responsibility for the
making of treaties in the national executive. However, the 1996 South African
constitution significantly revised this process. Treaty making in South Africa
is now a shared responsibility between the national executive and both
houses of parliament, with all bilateral treaties of significance and virtually all
multilateral treaties subject to an approval by both houses’ constitutional
rules.
There remain significant shortcomings in the Australian business of treaty
making, and in the brief time I have I will focus on one aspect, though I
would like to also briefly mention the continuing importance of the
government providing parliament with rigorous and detailed national
interest analyses and the problems posed by the government’s unexplained
refusal to convene the treaties council since its establishment, save on one
occasion. These issues will certainly be dealt with by other speakers.
The main point I would like to make today though is a broader one, and it
focuses on the role of JSCOT. Put simply, JSCOT has not proven to be the
vehicle for analysis, or even robust criticism, of government action about
treaties that some might have hoped. JSCOT’s usefulness is inevitably limited
by the fact that it is inevitably government controlled and therefore serves to
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legitimise rather than to critique government policy. Indeed, JSCOT has
almost always made recommendations in line with government policy.
Where JSCOT has been willing to criticise it has mostly done so in relation
to procedural issues—and we have heard examples such as the inadequate
consultation by the Treasury in relation to the failed multilateral agreement
on investment and the inadequate consultation with the states in relation to
the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement. These procedural issues have been
criticised, and validly, as arising in the process of treaty making, but there has
therefore been no opportunity for JSCOT to criticise questions of substance,
such as whether Australia should ratify the treaty at all. Except for the
occasion we have heard about, the other occasion was with regard to the
optional protocol to the torture convention. JSCOT recommended against
Australia’s ratification, but the government policy, of course, was not to ratify
it.
The members of JSCOT prefer consensus outcomes to issuing majority and
dissenting reports. I do not criticise this practice, and it has certainly made
displays of political partisanship within the committee relatively rare. The
committee generally takes a pragmatic approach to its reports and is more
likely to make recommendations that will be adopted by government than to
take a strong stance that might be ignored. This has led to JSCOT producing
somewhat decaffeinated reports, potentially detracting from the committee’s
influence.
In the inquiry into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the
then chair of the committee, Julie Bishop, worked closely with Mr Downer in
her role as chair and ran the committee with a view to achieving a unanimous
report in favour of Australia’s ratification of the Rome Statute. It is notable
that, despite the achievement of a unanimous report by Australia’s permanent
treaties scrutiny body, its opinion appears not to have carried as much weight
within the coalition as the views, for example, of the US government in
relation to the court, and nor did it ease the concerns expressed about the
International Criminal Court.
Even after JSCOT had issued its report, in the first of two meetings of the
party room to discuss Australia’s ratification a majority of government
members are said to have remained opposed to ratification, including senior
ministers and more privately the Prime Minister. Alexander Downer’s
recollection of the words used by his Prime Minister upon their exit from that
debate in the party room was, ‘Looks like you’re stuffed.’ The opinion of
parliament’s specialist treaties scrutiny body was regarded surprisingly
lightly within the government.
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Limitations in JSCOT’s role as effective scrutineer are also evident from the
experience of Australia’s entry into the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement.
Of course, one obvious point is that the free trade agreement was the subject
of a parallel parliamentary inquiry by a Senate select committee on the
agreement which was established on 11 February 2004 and had precisely the
same task and mandate as JSCOT. There was considerably greater public
reaction to the select committee inquiry than to the JSCOT inquiry, with the
select committee attracting well over twice the number of submissions made
to JSCOT. The inevitable implication is that there was greater public faith in
the rigour of an opposition controlled inquiry than in the government
controlled JSCOT. I appreciate that this is a political reality.
Yet it is the government’s response to the JSCOT inquiry that I would like to
focus on. JSCOT issued its conclusions and report on the Australia-US Free
Trade Agreement on 23 June 2004. That same day the legislation
implementing the Free Trade Agreement was introduced into the House of
Representatives. The remarkably short time frame between the tabling of
JSCOT’s report and the tabling of the free trade agreement legislation gave
members of parliament insufficient time to digest and debate the many
recommendations made by JSCOT in relation to the free trade agreement.
These factors suggest that the government had little interest in the actual
recommendations of JSCOT, and regarded the process as a formality that
would help to legitimise the government’s decision making. The select
committee was so appalled by the government’s attitude towards its own
treaty scrutiny committee that it described the series of events as a ‘mockery
of the process that was set up by the parliament ostensibly to ensure that a
proper examination of international treaties and agreements took place’.
The JSCOT process, therefore, we argue, cannot be said to provide a real
check on executive power. The committee tends not to produce detailed
analysis of executive decisions and has a record, which would likely be the
case whichever side of politics was in power, of falling into line with
government policy. Members of the public and non-government
organisations regularly make submissions to JSCOT and the committee plays
a very important role as a forum through which the electorate can voice
opinions about international treaties. Yet, the depth and timing of the JSCOT’s
scrutiny means that in most cases the submissions of members of the public to
JSCOT have had little impact on government decisions about international
law. The JSCOT process legitimises government decision making about
treaties without offering genuine scrutiny or criticism of government policy.
In conclusion, the greater transparency assured by the 1996 reforms must be
acknowledged and applauded. But Australia needs to take the other limbs of
scrutiny and democratic accountability of treaties even more seriously. It is
our view that parliament should be responsible for bringing about greater
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scrutiny of, and accountability in, government decision making about
international law and agreements as the institution best suited to imposing
checks on the executive.
Here is the punch: we believe that the issue of ratification of treaties of
major political, economic or social significance should be determined as with
other matters of importance by a majority vote of each house of parliament.
Each house should have the power as it currently has for a set number of days
with regard to regulations made by the executive to disallow a government
decision to assume new international obligations on behalf of Australia.
International law increasingly impacts on our domestic affairs. Courts, for
example, now use these treaties to interpret our law. It is no longer
appropriate to see it as the sole business of the executive. Given the impact
that certain international obligations can have on Australia’s economy,
environment, trade relations and the rights of individuals it is fitting that
these obligations receive adequate scrutiny before Australia decides to
commit itself to them. The obligation to persuade parliament that a treaty is in
Australia’s national interest would have the effect of increasing parliament’s
attention to the matter, enhancing the importance and relevance of JSCOT and
introducing increasing transparency, scrutiny and accountability into the
business of treaty making.
For those of you who were at the dinner last night, Alexander Downer also
considered this idea but rejected it on the basis that it would be
‘inconvenient’. That is the word he used. We ask whether this is really a good
enough reason. Moreover, I want to ask: is it actually true? The government
already adheres staunchly to a policy not to become a party to a treaty until
domestic law accords with the treaty, which often therefore leads to the need
to pass implementing legislation through parliament. In effect, therefore,
parliament already votes or approves treaty ratification and has the power to
prevent Australia’s entry into treaties. Notably to date, though, it has shown a
tendency to act in the national interest in considering such legislation. It has
also shown ability to act in urgent situations.
It should be noted that the urgent passage of international treaties is
relatively rare; however, for example, in the passage of the legislation in
relation to the Rome Statute we were up against a deadline because the treaty
was about to enter into force. On that occasion, the House of Representatives
was given three hours to debate 353 pages of implementing legislation for the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. But for a bit of whingeing
and moaning by the opposition at the lack of justification for the short time
frame, the legislation was passed without incident.
There is a further advantage to strengthening the role of parliament. An
enduring problem with Australia’s engagement with international law is that
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it speaks with two tongues. On the one hand, the executive may commit
Australia to the latest set of international standards and to their
implementation within Australia. On the other hand, the implementation of
these standards by parliament may not occur, leaving Australia in breach of
its commitments. Building parliament into the decision to take on new
obligations to a great extent in the first place may go some way to ensuring
greater accountability during the negotiation process as well as in the matter
of future compliance with the treaty. One problem with the timing of JSCOT’s
scrutiny is that it occurs too late—once the terms of the treaty have been
finalised and there is no longer a chance to influence its terms. If a new treaty
is not likely to be fully implemented by parliament this should be clear from
an early stage and Australia should be slow to make an international
commitment to the instrument. Once the treaty has been approved by
parliament, Commonwealth, state and territory governments must ensure
respect for its terms.
We put forward these proposals recognising that they would require a
major change in how Australia deals with international law and the
relationship between the executive and the parliament. But it is not a proposal
without support. I was visited last night by the prophet Rod Kemp. He was
referred to by Alexander Downer as the individual who had the initial idea
and motivation to create JSCOT. He expressed his support, having heard
what I intended to say today.
But we argue that these changes are necessary to set a new balance in the
roles of institutions more than a century after the Constitution was drafted.
Many of the issues Australia faces today, such as the threat of terrorism,
cannot be dealt with except as part of a discussion that leads to concerted
international action. Australia and Australians should engage in the creation
of international law and be prepared to comply with the international
obligations that it assumes. In this sense, we must recognise that no country is
an island set apart from the developing body of international law. Thank you.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Our next speaker is Neil Roberts.
Neil has been the member for Nudgee in the Queensland parliament since
1995. He is the Parliamentary Secretary to the Deputy Premier and Treasurer
and he is also the Minister for State Development, Trade and Innovation.
Before entering the Queensland parliament he was an industrial advocate and
an electrician. He holds a Bachelor of Business degree, a Graduate Certificate
in Business Administration and he is currently pursuing an MBA at the
Queensland University of Technology.
One thing that the treaties committee does with the tabling of each batch of
treaties is write to the premiers and chief ministers of the states and territories
and also the presiding officers of the state and territory parliaments. We have
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some of them here today. We do really appreciate getting the feedback from
the state governments. We often get really good consideration from the
Department of Premier and Cabinet in Queensland. Please welcome Neil
Roberts.
Mr Neil Roberts MP—Firstly, I need to make a correction. I thank Andrew
for the promotion to Minister for State Development. I am the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Deputy Premier, who has all of those portfolios in her kit bag.
But I would like to be the Minister for State Development. I would like to start
by adding my congratulations to the JSCOT committee on its 10-year
anniversary. I would also like to congratulate and thank Gillian Gould, who
last night—as those of you who were at the dinner would know—was
recognised for her 18 years of exemplary service to parliamentary committees.
I have participated in two committees and chaired one. All members of
committees rely absolutely on the professionalism and dedication of the staff.
Gillian, listening to the testimonies to your contributions over the last 18
years, you have done a fine job and we wish you well in your retirement.
I wanted to touch on four key issues today relating to the state’s interest in
treaty making: why the Queensland government, and indeed other state and
territory governments, have a key interest in treaty making; the importance of
consultation, particularly early consultations, with state and territory
governments; when and how the Queensland government is currently
consulted; and some suggested areas for improvement. The most obvious
place to start is to emphasise that treaties entered into by the Commonwealth
can and do have a direct and considerable impact on states and territories. For
example, a treaty may require a state or territory to amend its legislation or
policies, it may remove powers in areas which have been the responsibility of
a state or territory, or it may impose costs in relation to implementation. I
would like to give a few practical examples of these impacts.
When the Commonwealth ratified the United States free trade agreement, it
required a direct amendment to Queensland’s local industry policy. The
ratification of the ILO Convention No. 155, Occupational Safety and Health
Convention, created the potential for the Commonwealth to regulate
occupational health and safety, an area traditionally reserved for state and
territory governments. Finally, ratification of the protocol on preparedness,
response and cooperation regarding pollution incidents by hazardous and
noxious substances has resulted in Queensland bearing additional
administrative costs to ensure appropriate preparedness and response
capacity at oil and chemical terminals and ports. It is therefore self-evident
that state and territory governments are key stakeholders in the treaty-making
process.
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As such, one of the crucial elements of ensuring appropriate involvement in
the process is to ensure that active consultation occurs at key stages. This will
give states and territories the opportunity to raise issues about the policy
direction of a proposed treaty and its effect on state responsibilities. There are
two critical stages at which meaningful consultations should occur: during the
negotiations themselves and prior to the determination of an Australian
position. Appropriate consultation also includes the need, prior to ratification,
to reach agreement on the development of any legal or administrative
arrangements required to implement a treaty. In simple terms, it is important
to resolve very early in the process what will or will not be done by each
party and who is responsible to pay. It is also important to ensure that crossportfolio issues have been properly considered and that the costs and benefits
to local businesses and the community have been thoroughly identified and
evaluated.
Currently, early-stage consultation tends to occur at different stages of the
process. Information on new treaties is provided to states and territories in a
number of different ways. For example, information on proposed treaties is
currently provided via schedules from the Standing Committee on Treaties,
through dialogue between Commonwealth departmental officials and state
government officials, at ministerial council meetings or through direct
correspondence between the Commonwealth and state government ministers.
The Queensland government acknowledges that improvements in
consultation have occurred over the past 10 years. However, it is not always
clear which forum will be used, and there is little consistency regarding the
stage of negotiations at which consultation will take place. Consultation at the
tabling stage, however, is much more systematic and reliable. The Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties, or JSCOT, provides the only routine
consultation process that the Queensland government can rely on, largely
because it is the only one enshrined in the parliamentary process.
Queensland values the JSCOT process and, following recommendations
arising out of the last JSCOT seminar, has developed processes to table
proposed treaty actions in the Queensland parliament within 10 days of their
receipt. I understand that we are the only state or territory to do so. This
process is aimed at increasing the awareness and scrutiny of current treaty
negotiations by members of parliament and the public generally. It also
provides the mechanism by which the Queensland parliament can refer a
particular treaty to a parliamentary committee for inquiry and report if it
considers that such a process is necessary.
The Queensland Premier commenced tabling correspondence from JSCOT
on proposed treaty actions, together with national interest analyses, in March
2001. In the past 12 months, 26 treaties have been tabled in the Queensland
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parliament. Queensland also acknowledges that the responses we provide to
JSCOT do influence the JSCOT report to parliament. However, our ability to
provide comprehensive advice to JSCOT is fundamentally constrained by the
extent of early-stage consultation.
As I mentioned earlier, consultation processes in the treaty negotiations
stage are not uniform, and in some cases they are unreliable. It is evident that
the principles and procedures agreed by COAG in 1996 are not always
followed. COAG officials are currently undertaking a review of the
Commonwealth-state consultation process, and Queensland hopes that this
will deliver a more systematic and streamlined approach to consultation.
There are three areas which we believe would significantly improve the
existing treaty-making process. First, we would welcome advice at first
ministers level or central agency CEO level at the time when the
Commonwealth takes the decision to enter into treaty negotiations that could
have implications for a state or territory. This includes ongoing advice on the
progress of such treaty negotiations. Presently, Commonwealth departments
often write to Queensland line agencies, and we are grateful for this advice.
However, contact with first ministers or central agencies in the first instance
would enable a comprehensive whole-of-government consultation,
particularly in cases where there are limited time frames.
Within Queensland the Department of Premier and Cabinet is recognised as
the central point for dissemination of information about treaty negotiations. It
is responsible for whole-of-government consideration on specific treaty
matters and provides Queensland’s representation on the Standing
Committee on Treaties. It also coordinates the tabling of JSCOT advice in the
Queensland parliament and is therefore the logical initial point of contact.
I take this opportunity to point out that in this regard the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade’s approach to consultation on trade treaties has
improved significantly in recent times. Queensland’s recent experience with
the consultation on the United Arab Emirates free trade agreement has been
exemplary. For example, the federal minister for trade wrote to Premier
Beattie outlining Australia’s intentions to embark on negotiations and invited
Queensland’s views. A whole-of-government response was provided
outlining Queensland’s interests and preferred representative for ongoing
consultation. Queensland officials have subsequently been briefed after each
round of negotiations and in December 2005 Queensland representatives
participated in the Australian negotiation delegation and provided
information to the United Arab Emirates on the state government’s
procurement arrangements, which were a key aspect in negotiations. Trade
ministers have also been briefed via the national trade consultations. DFAT’s
approach represents a well-coordinated and genuine effort. Queensland
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would welcome a similar approach from other Commonwealth departments
on treaties that have implications for state and territory governments.
The second area for improvement is the earlier provision of national interest
analyses. Currently national interest analyses are only made available when
treaties are tabled in parliament. Earlier receipt of drafts may promote a more
rigorous analysis of issues and provide scope for greater consultation. As
national interest analyses are intended to reflect the results of consultation, it
would be appropriate for state and territory governments to have some
control over the extent of consultation portrayed in the final document.
Numerous Commonwealth departments state in the NIA that the Queensland
government has been consulted by virtue of listing the treaty in the schedules
provided to members of the Standing Committee on Treaties. While schedules
do provide an opportunity for states and territories to seek further
information, this does not guarantee that such information or copies of draft
texts will be provided.
As an example, Queensland was notified in August 2005 via the treaties
schedule of Australia’s intention to negotiate amendments to the double
taxation treaty with New Zealand. It was suggested in the treaties schedule
that consultation with state and territory governments was not required
because the treaty only applied to federal taxes. It was not until the treaty was
concluded and the NIA was provided by JSCOT that it became evident that
the amendments prescribed an exchange of certain information with New
Zealand. In the very short time frame available under the JSCOT process it
has emerged that the treaty may be inconsistent with the secrecy provisions of
Queensland’s revenue laws. It would have been helpful to have worked
through these long before the tabling stage.
Our experience with trade treaty processes has highlighted that written
advice from the responsible Commonwealth agency to the Premier at an early
stage provides high-level engagement and assessment of the relevance of the
treaty to state government interests and an opportunity to establish the
appropriate forum for ongoing consultation. Details on the agreed forum and
forum outcomes could then be included in the NIAs and would provide a
true consultation trial.
The final suggested area for improvement involves the Treaties Council,
which was agreed by COAG under the 1996 principles and procedures. The
role of the council is to consider treaties of importance or of a sensitive nature
to states and territories, either of its own motion or where a treaty is referred
to it by any jurisdiction or the Standing Committee on Treaties. Although the
1996 principles and procedures specified that the Treaties Council would
meet at least annually, normally at the same time and place as COAG, the
Treaties Council has met only once, in 1997. This is despite calls from a
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number of premiers, including Premier Beattie in mid-2000, for a meeting of
the Treaties Council to discuss several treaties of importance, including the
Kyoto protocol.
In summary, there is no question the past decade has seen considerable
improvements in Australia’s system of treaty making. Queensland
particularly values the processes used by the JSCOT. These processes provide
certainty for us to have input into the treaty-making process, albeit once
negotiations have been concluded. Coupled with Queensland’s parliamentary
tabling process, the JSCOT provides a mechanism for increasing the
awareness and scrutiny of proposed treaty actions by members of parliament
and the community generally.
Queensland welcome the intent of the reforms under the principles and
procedures agreed by the Council of Australian Governments in 1996 to
create a more transparent, consultative and accountable approach, but there is
room for improvement. In particular, improvements to Commonwealth-state
consultation at the treaty negotiation stage is crucial, as this is the optimal
time for federal issues or particular state reservations or exclusions to be
negotiated. The recent efforts of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
during the United Arab Emirates free trade agreement provide an excellent
example of what can be achieved when more effective consultation is
undertaken. Queensland would welcome all Commonwealth agencies
adopting a similar approach where treaties have the possibility of
implications for states and territories.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Thank you very much, Neil. Since
1996 the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australasian Legal
Information Institute have jointly developed the Australian Treaties Library.
We are pleased that reports of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties are to
be included on the Treaties Library. I now invite Professor Andrew Mowbray,
a professor of law and information technology at the University of
Technology, Sydney and codirector of Austlii, to provide us with some
insights into the redesigned library.
Prof. Andrew Mowbray—I will try and keep this fairly brief, because I
realise I am standing between you and morning tea. It was going to be
incredibly brief because the system did not work as at nine o’clock this
morning. But I am hoping that in a moment we will be able to bring up the
system. As Andrew said, Austlii has had a long relationship with DFAT.
Apart from the High Court, our partnership with DFAT has been one of our
longest. We appreciate that and I think the public does as well. The other
thing that is notable about the system is that the Treaties Library is, I think,
the largest national treaties system anywhere in the world. What is more, it is
free. You can, if you want to, have a closer look at the system later on. There is
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a system running up the back. We have also handed out a handout which
gives you a starting point.
When we had our first Law via the Internet Conference, which some people
might have gone to, when I was driving in there was this great flash of
lightning that hit the top of the tower at UTS. Sure enough, it took out the
whole internet for the first three hours of the conference. You can imagine that
when you have got a conference called ‘Law via the Internet’ that made things
rather difficult. We had to reorganise all the speakers.
A PowerPoint presentation was then given—
Prof. Andrew Mowbray—Basically, the main thing we have added and the
point of today’s launch is the JSCOT library. The link is probably so small that
you cannot see it anyway, so it was hardly worth waiting for. But you get a bit
of an idea of what it looks like. I will not do a demonstration. Right at the top
is the new JSCOT database. You can see some of the treaties there. It is now
possible to do a search over all of that material. If you search for ‘WIPO’ you
get in the results 56 treaties, reports and so forth. The other thing we always
struggle with on these occasions is knowing how exactly to launch one of
these things. Basically all I will do is declare it launched.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Thank you very much, Professor
Mowbray. We do have on our website a link to the Australian Treaties Library
as well. Thank you for that capability so that we can now search JSCOT
reports and also for launching the redesigned Australian Treaties Library. The
intention now is to have an interaction between seminar participants and the
panel. There is now time for questions. I invite questions from participants.
Prof. Shirley Scott—I am from the University of New South Wales. I have a
question for Devika. Can you elaborate a bit more on your proposals—in
particular, if you see the problem with JSCOT, that partisan politics comes
into play, how will the parliamentary process remove the partisan politics or
minimise it and, secondly, what role would JSCOT have within your
proposals?
Ms Devika Hovell—It is not a criticism of JSCOT that partisan politics
comes into play. The fact is that partisanship is very rarely an aspect of a
JSCOT report. The tendency has been for consensus to be achieved and to
support government policy. In that sense—having a legitimised government
policy—partisan politics comes into play. In the present climate, with
government controlling both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
again there will be a limited role or potential for the parliament. But my point
is twofold. First of all, occasionally the Senate will therefore be in a less
government controlled context. The other thing is to get parliament
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interested, to ensure that parliament is tracking the process. It is an interesting
aspect of Hansard that, when Downer announced that the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court had been signed, the quote in Hansard was ‘Oh’.
I assume that indicated roars of surprise by opposition members who were
not even aware that the whole thing was being negotiated. There is no blame
on the government for that, but I want parliament to be more engaged with
the process during the negotiation with the JSCOT reports, into which so
much work goes. Again, there is the issue of whether the treaty should be
ratified so there is more democratic accountability for the treaty ratification.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Thank you.
Mr John Langmore—I am from the University of Melbourne. I want to
speak about whether Australia complies with treaty agreements. It has been
argued by the UN Human Rights Commission that Australia has not fully
honoured its human rights commitments. It can be pretty persuasively argued
that the industrial relations legislation does not conform with Australia’s
obligations under ILO conventions. Of course, this is a partisan question, in a
way, but it has a serious intent.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Shock!
Mr John Langmore—I wonder whether you would like to comment on
that.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—It is open to the Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties to examine any treaty of which Australia is a party. It
is also open to us to examine any treaty that is currently under negotiation. It
is certainly open to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties to look at those
things.
Mr Kevin Rozzoli—I am the National President of the Australasian Study
of Parliament Group. My question is basically to Neil, but we could have
comments from Devika and Andrew. It would seem that the process of
communicating directly with premiers or chief ministers and presidents and
speakers is probably not the most effective way of engaging a parliament,
although it may engage a government response—the two things are subtly
different. I am wondering whether or not there is value in proposing to state
parliaments that in fact they assign treaty considerations to a committee—not
that you would designate a particular one, but surely there would be within
the committee framework a committee that could have that added to its
responsibilities—and to engage that committee as early as possible so that the
parliament itself, rather than the executive, has a role in responding to the
inquiry. Devika mentioned greater engagement of parliament in her address,
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and this would be one way of doing it and getting a more representative
opinion of the community, rather than the executive.
Mr Neil Roberts MP—We looked at this issue some years ago, I think
arising out of the reports of the committee in 2000—it might have been earlier.
A decision was taken that we would not establish a separate treaties
committee. However, our legal and constitutional committee does have the
power to examine and report on treaty proposals to our parliament. So that
option is already there. I am not aware whether that option has been exercised
to date. In fact it has not. But the option is there for a joint parliamentary
committee to examine and report to our parliament if it chooses to do so. We
have given that committee that additional responsibility. I am not aware of
the discussion that took place at the time but there was a detailed discussion
on whether in fact a separate committee should be set up, and the decision
taken at the time was to at least assign that opportunity to an existing
parliamentary committee.
Ms Devika Hovell—I have no further comments. I will not make a
proposal potentially for state parliaments to have a veto over treaties. Maybe I
will wait for the next 10 years.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Thank you. I think it is a good idea. It
is worth looking at. As I said, I do write to the state premiers, the chief
ministers of the territories and the presiding officers. We are often
underwhelmed by their response, but generally I might get a letter back
saying something like: ‘We have tabled it, thank you very much. We do not
wish to make any comments at this stage.’ An Attorney-General’s committee
or a legal committee of the state parliament may actually have a look at it. I
think it is a good idea. We do want more considered submissions from the
states and territories, because we try to incorporate them in our reports and it
does help our consideration.
Mr Kenneth Jasper—I am the member for the Murray Valley in the
Victorian parliament. Just to provide some clarification, in Victoria I became a
member of what was called, in 1996, the Federal-State Relations Committee.
We were involved with treaties and released a report in October 1997,
International treaty making and the role of the states. It is very interesting that the
committee lasted from 1996 to 1999. There was a change of government and
the government decided that the committee was no longer relevant. It was
very disappointing. As far as I am concerned, in the Victorian parliament we
do not see the treaties at all. Our report made a number of findings and
contained six recommendations, including that the states be involved with
reviewing treaties and that there be some consultation. It is obvious that the
Queensland government are doing that. I think we should be recommending
and making sure that the state governments not only receive those treaties at
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a government level but indeed that a committee continue to investigate those
treaties. Currently I am on the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee in
Victoria and we do not see those treaties at all. That should be something that,
at a state government level, we should be taking on as an important role
within federal-state relations.
Prof. John Halligan—This is really a restatement of the first question to
Devika: how do you see this committee evolving? There is clearly a spectrum
of committees in parliaments in terms of how they come out with their
decisions, ranging from unanimity through to partisanship. I think your
critique is that there is too much unanimity here or complementing
government, which of course is a legitimate role for some committees. But if
you go to the partisanship end, of course, you run the risk of rejection of
recommendations. Some committees sometimes seem to find a middle path
and the question here is: what is the middle path which might balance the
institutional constraints associated with the executive with a somewhat
greater role for a parliamentary committee?
Ms Devika Hovell—Thank you for that opportunity. I do want to clarify
that I am not criticising JSCOT for achieving decisions by consensus. The
absence of partisanship within that committee is to be commended. What is
concerning of course is the timing of that inquiry. Through no fault of JSCOT,
they can only consider a treaty once the terms have been finalised and they
have no opportunity to have any impact on those terms. For them to say that
article 4 is inappropriate and should be amended is no longer possible. They
do have the opportunity to criticise the treaty, expose its flaws and to
recommend against ratification, which, as we have heard, has certainly
occurred on one occasion with Kazakhstan. But potentially there are flaws
within other treaties and the comparison between the report provided by
JSCOT and the Senate select committee showed that with considerable rigour
and there was a critical report by the Senate committee. There was criticism in
the JSCOT report but the details did not come in as much as in the Senate
select committee report. Therefore this opportunity to get parliament
involved and allow these recommendations to have real impact within the
parliamentary context is what I am pushing for.
Mr Dick Adams MP—I think this issue reflects on the culture within the
committee system of the House of Representatives to endeavour to get
consensus on reports. This usually occurs where we are way out in front and
dealing with issues. You get a report on good information, a good report with
good recommendations which can be used by everybody within the policymaking process. You usually get dissenting reports et cetera when you come
across the politics of the day. I think that JSCOT also suffers from the fact that
it is a creature of the government more so than the parliament, and every
other committee of the House of Representatives suffers from that too. I think
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that that is a weakness for the House of Representatives and it needs to
broaden that out.
The Senate is different because it has had more independence and a bigger
role. If changes take place in the parliamentary processes of electing a
President or resolving those issues into the future, that could be a significant
factor for the House of Representatives. I think that the role of the committees
is pretty critical in getting a little bit more influence or power in being able to
set their own destiny.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—I would just like to say something in
defence of the committee’s report on the US free trade agreement. In that
report from memory there were something like 20 recommendations which
related to the implementation of the free trade agreement, which we thought
were consistent with the spirit of the free trade agreement. It was written very
much in terms of trying to find a middle path in getting agreement between
government and the opposition in what was an incredibly contentious issue. I
cannot remember how many chapters there were but the entire report was
agreed between government and opposition members and then there was just
a final page which the opposition members put in saying, ‘We are not
prepared to recommend that it be ratified at this stage. We require further
information.’ I cannot say for sure but if I were Mark Vaile I do not think that
that is the report I would have wanted. It was not a tick and flick exercise. We
looked at it and, given all of the competing pressures which are political
realities, it was a legitimate expression of the committee. Certainly it had a lot
of recommendations—from memory, over 20—related to the evidence that we
had received. It certainly was not a rubber stamp. I have been told we can
have a couple more questions because the Hyatt is still baking the cakes for
morning tea.
Dr June Verrier—I am interested in the comment about the failure of the
consultation in COAG and the COAG Treaties Council meetings. In spite of
apparent pressure or requests from state premiers for those meetings to take
place, what was the explanation? Why did it fall apart? Does that comment on
COAG machinery generally in that it only works when the Commonwealth
thinks it should work?
Mr Neil Roberts MP—I cannot give you a full answer to that question. My
understanding is that the responsibility for calling a meeting of the Treaties
Council rests solely with the Prime Minister. The agreement was that the
council was to meet annually. Unfortunately, meetings of that committee have
not been held. I do not think that is unusual in terms of this committee; there
are other committees which in their original stages were intended to meet
more regularly but those original agreements have not been adhered to.
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Ultimately, it is a decision of the Prime Minister of the day, who has the
ability to decide when that committee meets.
Our Premier has felt on a couple of occasions, particularly in 2000 with
matters such as the Kyoto Protocol, that there should have been, in
accordance with the 1996 agreement, a meeting of that committee so that a full
and frank discussion could have taken place at a very high level about the
serious implications of some of those treaties. But the matter ultimately is not
in the hands of state premiers; it is in the hands of the Prime Minister.
Mr Paul McBride—I have a comment on Dick Adams’s speech, and that is
that tax treaties are actually very interesting once you get to know them. Next
time we present in front of the committee we will try to jazz it up a little. I am
open to your guidance.
Mr Dick Adams—I look forward to the occasion.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Diagrams and visual aids are always
good.
Mr Paul McBride—We will see what we can do.
CHAIR (Dr Andrew Southcott MP)—Thank you. As there are no more
questions I will adjourn the hearing until eleven o’clock.
Proceedings suspended from 10.37 am to 11.04 am
Session 2: Treaty making and review in a federal system
CHAIR (Senator Dana Wortley)—Welcome to the second session. I am a
senator from South Australia and one of seven senators on JSCOT. The theme
for this session is treaty making and review in a federal system. For some time
prior to the 1996 reforms, concerns had been raised in various circles about
the obligations which could be imposed on the states and territories by the
Commonwealth government entering into treaties. One of the main bodies
established to address this problem and provide a vehicle for consultation
was the Standing Committee on Treaties.
I have the honour this morning of introducing Petrice Judge, who will
provide us with some insights into the role of the Standing Committee on
Treaties as part of the treaty scrutiny process. Petrice is currently the
Executive Director of the Office of Federal Affairs in the Western Australian
Department of Premier and Cabinet. Petrice has a longstanding interest in
treaty negotiations and the impact on state legislation, policy and practice.
She was an inaugural member of the Standing Committee on Treaties and has
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also actively participated in Australian delegations as the representative for
the states and territories. I invite Petrice to come forward.
Mrs Petrice Judge—Thank you very much. Welcome, ladies and
gentlemen. I would particularly like to acknowledge the presence of some
members of the Standing Committee on Treaties from the other jurisdictions. I
want to emphasise that the views I am going to present are purely my own.
They do not represent the views of my state nor indeed my department. So
this is off the record, isn’t it, Mr Griffiths! But I am a bit concerned that
everything is being recorded.
My views have been formed as having longstanding involvement with
SCOT and also managing the area within the Western Australian government
that tries to feed into the JSCOT process. I have participated in Australian
delegations and I have the utmost respect for my Commonwealth colleagues
and ministers who are part of that process. So what I have to say does not
reflect on the stance that they take in the negotiations. I am really looking at
the treaty scrutiny process and more precisely the role of SCOT. But it is all
about consultation with the states.
Overriding this whole process, there is no question that there needs to be a
unified national voice in treaty negotiations. Nevertheless it is crucial that this
accommodates a range of disparate concerns, especially where a treaty
impacts on the constituent governments—that is, the states—and their
legislation, policy and practice. In order to do this, the states’ involvement
needs to be facilitated and they need to understand the art of treaty making,
which has its own language and very much its own set of behaviours. So, in
this example, the search for the perfect clause is represented as tedious,
immaterial and in fact pretty silly. However, we all know the importance for
our peak lobby groups of even a comma in a sentence, so it is a really
important role. Before JSCOT considers a treaty process, the states have to use
SCOT as their pre-eminent means of highlighting the concerns that they wish
brought to the attention of the Commonwealth in pursuing the final
negotiating positions. So I will consider how SCOT was set up, what it is
meant to do and how effective it has been in doing it.
When the reforms were introduced in 1996, SCOT was already in existence
and it provided assistance to the Commonwealth on negotiation and
implementation of treaties, but it is true to say that it was in an atmosphere of
great heat. It was not a comprehensive coverage. I felt that the states were
really regarded by the Commonwealth officials as the least important of the
special interest groups that they needed to consult. You would have industry
perhaps first, environment groups second and states very much an
afterthought. So at the time of the inquiry in 1995 the states and territories
made a submission and they really wanted to emphasise that states and
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territories were not seeking a power of veto nor did they really want a direct
role for their parliaments, but they certainly wanted proper and detailed
consultation and political accountability. One of the issues was that SCOT was
a committee of officials and they felt it diminished their role and their ability
to influence. So, in relation to the treaty making process, various forces came
together and, with the incoming government, clearly on the table were issues
of greater transparency, political oversight and, particularly, effective
consultation with the states.
So we come to the June 1996 COAG meeting, and COAG established the
Treaties Council and revised the existing principles of procedures for
Commonwealth-state consultation on treaties to include a defined role for
SCOT. We had high hopes of these changes, particularly of the Treaties
Council, which consists of the Prime Minister, the premiers and the chief
ministers with the Commonwealth Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was to be
advisory, to consider treaties and to meet once a year to coincide with COAG.
COAG tends to meet twice a year so we thought maybe it might meet once or
twice a year. There was an inaugural meeting on 7 November 1997, as you
have heard, and Western Australia took a very big lead in coordinating
amongst the states and territories the issues that were going to be discussed.
For the record, the treaties and international instruments discussed were:
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the draft protocol
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, the World
Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement, WTO
negotiations on financial services, the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples and the Convention to Combat Desertification. They were
all interesting treaties but it is fair to say that there was not a lot of discussion.
The council has not met since, despite requests, as you have heard, from
individual premiers. I know the Western Australian Premier has asked on
four occasions and has received no response.
It should have met, we believe, over the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement. It did not. Why not? You did ask that before. The Prime Minister
was asked in August 2005 why the Treaties Council had met only once,
particularly in the light of these bilateral negotiations over free trade
agreements. He said that it is only one mechanism for Commonwealth state
consultation on treaty matters and that there were a range of standing and ad
hoc consultative processes which were used to inform those negotiations so
he did not see there was a need to convene a further meeting. So much for the
Treaties Council! Did the revitalised SCOT fare any better?
SCOT is set up to identify treaties of sensitivity and importance to the
states, to have regard to the potential to influence finances and future policy
decisions of the states and also to recognise the need for state participation in
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implementation. It also has a role of facilitating information flow from the
Commonwealth to the states and to be the vehicle for coordinating state and
territory representation on delegations for important treaty negotiations.
There is great potential in those terms of reference. Does it carry out those
roles?
How SCOT works now is that there are meetings twice a year in Canberra
and this enables a lot of experts who are based in Canberra to attend and to
receive questions. There is central agency coordination organised by the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and we have representatives
from premiers’ departments, in the main, across Australia who attend those
meetings. A schedule of current treaty actions is prepared by the
Commonwealth and distributed to the states in advance of the meeting. The
states actively caucus about what they would like to receive greater
information about and they would probably request about 12 detailed written
briefings. They have a look at that and say, ‘We would like to discuss about
half of those at the meeting.’ We also have standing items on the agenda,
updates from DFAT and A-G’s.
Does SCOT work? The schedule is a very good discipline. We are forced to
provide that information through channels and we effectively work as a
clearing house so we at least know what treaties are under consideration and
the relevant contact points if we want to influence it. The written briefings are
extremely helpful and a much greater improvement on the previous meetings
which I attended. I became very skilled at writing very fast because I was
trying to take up as much information as I could so I could report it back to
my colleagues who were very interested in the double taxation agreement, for
example.
Towards the end of 2003 and the start of 2004, the treaty schedules did
become more useful because SCOT had an influence on how they should be
presented. There is an ongoing review of the strengths and weaknesses of
SCOT but I am not too sure where it is going to go or how seriously it is being
taken. We would say that SCOT has developed from being simply a forced
information giving exercise to one where there is more dialogue at the
meeting and there is more interaction. But, essentially, it is a pretty modest
gain. We have established an information flow but we are far from
implementing the principles and procedures which were agreed to at COAG.
They are very worthwhile reading. What do they involve?
Essentially, the principles and procedures involve a more genuine
commitment to consultation rather than, as has been mentioned before,
merely mentioning in the national interest analysis that states have been
provided with a treaty schedule. That does not equal consultation. We really
want to have the opportunity to become involved earlier and to have

78

TREATY SCRUTINY: A TEN YEAR REVIEW

sufficient time to develop positions and let the Commonwealth negotiators
know there are issues of concern to the states. The issue about time,
particularly, was demonstrated in the bilateral free trade agreements where
there was an emphasis on the states developing reservation lists of legislation
that was not going to be compliant with the draft terms of the treaty. We
simply did not have enough time to pick up mistakes because we were in
such a pressure cooker time frame of getting the information to the
Commonwealth. I think there needs to be meaningful involvement of the
Treaties Council and a more coordinated use of ministerial councils that have
an interest in the subject matter of the treaty.
There is also the need for there to be recognition that all jurisdictions have
responsibilities. It is not just window dressing that we are all in the room
together. I heard one Commonwealth official—I do not know if he is here
today—say before he went into the room, ‘I’ll feed the chooks some wheat.’
That did not really put us in the best frame of mind to be consulted over this
treaty. The states have to resource it too because it does have tremendous
impact on the states. We have to allocate more people to having a look at
what they are and we have to find mechanisms to let the Commonwealth
know what we want to have portrayed in the negotiations.
It is useful to have a look at the US free trade agreement, which has been
mentioned several times. That was very revealing as to the stage we have got
with consultation. There were lots of meetings and there were many forums
but it is fair to say that there was forum shopping on the part of the
Commonwealth officials. They would go perhaps to a line agency group and
hear something that was more conducive to include in the negotiations. We
felt that there needed to be greater coordination. There was involvement by
ministers, and ultimately premiers had to become involved because the
Commonwealth needed the states because they wanted to offer nine
government procurement markets to the US. So the premiers had to come in
and commit to Australia being able to conclude the agreement.
In that negotiation of the US free trade agreement, Australia is seen very
much as an unequal partner, a very much diminished partner in relation to
the US. Certainly, the states were unequal in their relationship with the
Commonwealth in those negotiations. We do not expect a chair at the table
but we really do want to have our issues squarely on the table. To ensure
early recognition of what those issues are, you need to consider
implementation issues. That needs to be done by SCOT and I think SCOT
should function as the secretariat to the Treaties Council, which is what it was
set up to function as. That would enable there to be greater political
accountability, which is what the issue was before the 1996 reforms. This
would help to deliver to the states’ satisfaction the meaning of the verb ‘to
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consult’, which to remind you is, ‘to have regard for when making plans’.
That is all the states are asking for. Thank you.
CHAIR (Senator Dana Wortley)—Thank you, Petrice. There were seven
senators on the committee and we very often ask questions specifically
relating to our states. Our next speaker, Anne Twomey, has aroused our
curiosity by her title, ‘Treaty Reform—What the states wanted, what they got
and what they want now’. Who better to know that than the secretary of the
committee which produced the report Trick or treaty? As many of you are
aware, in 1994 the Senate asked its Legal and Constitutional References
Committee to inquire into the Commonwealth’s treaty making power. The
recommendations of that committee were taken into account in instituting the
1996 reforms. Anne, I welcome you to the microphone.
Ms Anne Twomey—Thank you. The Trick or treaty? report that the Senate
Legal and Constitutional References Committee completed in 1995 was one of
the most important reports that that committee ever produced, I suspect, and
one of the most significant reports for the parliament. As many of you would
know, a lot of work goes into parliamentary committee reports but many of
them are ignored or lie on a shelf for a long time without receiving a great
deal of response. The reference to the committee concerning treaties was
important in itself because it was the result of a great deal of community
concern. There was concern in the states and in the public that there was, as
was mentioned last night at the dinner, a democratic deficit in relation to
treaties and a concern that there was not sufficient transparency and
accountability in the treaty making process.
The Senate committee travelled around Australia. It took submissions in
every state and received a lot of evidence of that concern. It worked quite
hard to present recommendations that were unanimous through all the
parties participating in the committee and that would be effective. There was
a discussion this morning about the benefits or the detriments of unanimity.
From our point of view, when we were looking at this in the Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee, we considered that there was a great
deal of power in unanimity. Treaties at the time was an extremely
controversial issue and to get unanimous agreement from the Labor Party, the
Liberal Party, the National Party, the Democrats and the Greens on an issue
such as treaties, which was so controversial, was an extremely powerful
message to send to the government and resulted in nearly all of the
committee’s recommendations being supported and implemented.
The other interesting thing from the point of view of the states and the
territories is that the states and territories took the issue sufficiently seriously
to work extremely hard in developing a unanimous state and territory
submission to the committee. As you would know, one of the problems with
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federalism, particularly in the conflict between the states and the
Commonwealth from time to time, is that the Commonwealth can quite
happily divide and rule because the states are not necessarily agreed on a
particular position. Because the states took this issue so seriously, they
realised that the only way they were going to achieve change was to get a
unanimous submission to put to the Senate committee, and that is what they
did.
The other powerful aspect of the state and territory submission, apart from
its unanimity, was the fact that it was a very measured submission. There was
nothing in the submission that proclaimed states’ rights. There was no call, as
Petrice mentioned, for the states to have a veto over treaties. Those were the
types of populist things that a state could have easily fallen into, and the
result would have been the Commonwealth being able to say, ‘These
proposals are unreasonable or impracticable’ and to take little account of the
state and territory submission. But the fact that the states and territories put in
a unanimous submission that was very measured in what it called for meant
that it was far more likely to achieve true reforms and practical reforms to the
treaty system. That is indeed what happened.
So what were the states seeking? First of all, the most important thing was
better information. States and territories were concerned that they were not
getting sufficient information and that their constituents in the states and
territories—the citizens out there—were particularly concerned that they did
not have enough access to information. One of the things that the states and
territories called for was for the Commonwealth to go through the process of
creating treaty impact statements, as they were called then. The idea was not
just to use this to inform the states and territories of what the potential impact
of treaties would be; it was also intended as an intellectual discipline for the
Commonwealth to go through. If Commonwealth officers knew that they had
to sit down and work out what the impact of the treaty would be, what the
benefits of it would be, what the disadvantages of it would be, what sort of
changes would have to be made in the law to implement it—if they had to go
through that intellectual process before getting to the point of ratification and
if, in going through that process, realise, ‘Yes, my arguments are looking
pretty flimsy on the advantage side; I am finding difficulty in giving plausible
arguments as to why we should enter into this treaty’—then hopefully there
would be some realisation by the Commonwealth that: ‘Maybe there is some
problem about entering into this treaty and maybe we shouldn’t enter into it
just to appear to be good international citizens. Maybe we should take more
account of the reasons why we are entering into it and the impact of it.’ So the
call by the states for treaty impact statements was not just a matter of
informing the states, very important though that may be, but also a matter of
imposing a process and an intellectual discipline upon the Commonwealth.
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The second thing the states sought was better consultation. We just heard
Petrice talking about that and about the meaning of consultation. SCOT,
which pre-existed the 1996 reforms, was generally seen by the states as a
clearing house for information. The Commonwealth would come, dump a
load of information on the table or speak very quickly, requiring officers to
write very quickly. But it was not a body that involved any true exchange of
information between the Commonwealth and the states. There was no
participation in terms of the states responding, saying, ‘These are our
concerns, these are our difficulties, this is where it is going to impact on us.’
So there was no true interaction between the Commonwealth and the states in
SCOT.
The states also wanted to have greater transparency in terms of an annual
report that would be published which would explain how the states had been
consulted on treaties and what objections the states might have recorded in
relation to treaties so that that was a matter that could go back out to the
community as well. So those consultations, to the extent there ever were any,
that occurred in private and secret were in some way later made accountable
through some sort of publishing process—another request of the states.
The third point was greater political accountability. The states were
concerned that SCOT was only dealing with things at the officials level and
that to give sufficient importance to treaty negotiations, things had to be dealt
with at the political level through heads of government. Therefore they
proposed the establishment of a treaties council, which was to be an adjunct
to the COAG process, as Petrice has told you, and was envisioned to meet at
least once or maybe twice a year as part of that COAG process.
Finally and perhaps you might think curiously, the states and territories did
not ask for a veto role in relation to treaties. They could have asked for that
through the Treaties Council; they did not. What they did ask for was a
greater role for the Commonwealth parliament in relation to treaties. You
might wonder why state governments would be concerned that the
Commonwealth parliament get more involved in treaties. I think it is partly
seen as something that the Commonwealth government might feel a bit more
comfortable with doing in terms of a forum in which treaties can be discussed
and addressed but not a forum controlled by the states.
The states and territories saw the Commonwealth parliament as not just a
Commonwealth body. I know that the Senate, as the states house, is
something that has been regarded as irrelevant for at least the last 100 years;
but the Senate still is a states house to the extent that senators come from each
state in equal numbers, so there is a greater proportion in the Senate of
senators who come from Western Australia or Tasmania, and those numbers
do affect the way issues are seen in the party room or in parliamentary
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committees as well. So the fact that there is that greater representation of the
states in the Senate can flow through where there are particular state
concerns, because state concerns may not be just related to states governments
per se. They may be concerns of a state that affect a state’s economy, so
Queensland may have particular concerns about sugar, Tasmania will have
particular concerns about salmon, Western Australia will have particular
concerns about desertification or mining. And those concerns are not just state
government matters, they are matters that are relevant to members of
parliament who come from those particular states and who are concerned
about the effect of those matters on their constituents. So to that extent the
Commonwealth parliament and its role in relation to treaties still has some
relevance in protecting state interests.
What the states and territories asked for in their submission was, first of all,
for the establishment of a joint parliamentary committee on treaties, the result
of which was JSCOT. So the states and territories supported the creation of
JSCOT. Secondly, and more controversially, the states and territories asked for
a Commonwealth parliamentary veto in relation to treaties so that either
house of the Commonwealth parliament could veto a treaty. The idea
envisaged was something akin to the disallowance of regulations. Given that
most treaties are uncontroversial or many treaties are of a similar form, those
sorts of treaties would go through on the nod; unless anybody objected to
them, they would automatically be approved. So it would not be a matter of
holding up the treaty system by having to have a debate on each treaty and a
formal vote for approval. Everything would go through as approved unless,
within a certain period of a sitting day, there was an objection, which would
bring on a debate. If either house voted against the ratification of a treaty, that
should be binding on the government.
I have to say there were a few constitutional issues about that too. There
was an issue on the extent to which the parliament could bind the executive in
relation to the ratification of treaties. But that was the recommendation of the
states and territories. So, instead of asking for their own veto in relation to
treaties, they hoped that, if a treaty were sufficiently controversial to be
something that the states and territory governments objected to, those
objections would get a run perhaps in the Senate and result in a treaty being
vetoed at that level. They could do that without claiming states’ rights; they
could do that through a Commonwealth forum, being the Commonwealth
parliament. That is what the states asked for in 1995. What did they get?
Well, the reforms flowing from the Senate’s Trick or treaty? report in 1996
did make a significant difference. First of all, in relation to consultation, we
have heard that there were reforms to SCOT and the SCOT process. The
Commonwealth agreed to develop national interest analyses, which are
effectively the types of treaty impact statements that the states had been
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requesting. So the consultation certainly improved, although as I will mention
later there are still some concerns about it. In terms of political accountability,
one would have to say that the 1996 reforms failed to achieve much at all. A
treaties council was established. Interestingly, although the Senate
committee’s report largely recommended what the states and territories had
requested, there was a divergence in relation to the treaties council. The
members of the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee
rejected the state recommendation about a treaties council composed of heads
of government—an adjunct to COAG. Instead, they proposed something a
little bit more ambitious. They wanted a formal treaties council composed of
representatives of both government and opposition from each of the states
and representatives from all the major and minor parties from the
Commonwealth parliament.
You might discern why this recommendation was made; the Senate Legal
and Constitutional References Committee was composed of backbenchers
who were members of the opposition and members of small parties. As they
said in their meeting, ‘We want our say, too.’ So they recommended that a
treaties council be composed that represented both oppositions and
governments from all the state parliaments, as well as from the
Commonwealth parliament. I have to say the committee secretariat did point
out at the time that it was fairly unlikely that sort of recommendation would
be accepted by the government, and on that point we were correct. The
government did not accept that and, in fact, accepted the state and territory
submission, which was to create a treaties council that was an adjunct to
COAG.
As you have heard from previous speakers, the much vaunted treaties
council has only ever met once. The document titled Principles and procedures
for Commonwealth-state consultation on treaties, which was determined at COAG
in 1996—this is the document that sets out the rules for consultation on
treaties—says that the treaties council will meet ‘at least once a year’. It also
says:
The role of the Treaties Council is to consider treaties and other international instruments of
particular sensitivity and importance to the States and Territories either of its own motion, or
where a treaty is referred to it by any jurisdiction, a Ministerial Council, an intergovernmental
committee of COAG or by SCOT.

As you have heard from other speakers, those terms clearly state that any
state or territory can refer a matter to the treaties council, so the treaties
council should operate when called upon to do so by any state. As far as I can
tell, most states—or probably every state at one stage or another—has asked
for the treaties council to be formed to discuss a treaty and the
Commonwealth has refused to hold a treaties council.
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We have never had a clear explanation for this; nor has there been an
explanation as to why the Commonwealth has any right to refuse a meeting
of the treaties council. One can only assume that if the state premiers got
together and said, ‘We were having a treaties council but the Prime Minister
did not attend,’ it would be a relatively futile exercise. The consequence of all
this is that the treaties council is effectively useless. Its only real power or
importance is in the fact that it notionally exists, so it is a structure that can be
used if need be. As we have seen through the US free trade agreement
process, there has been consultation with state premiers but it has bypassed
the treaties council. It has been going through other means. Why that means
was chosen rather than going through the more formal treaties council I really
do not know. Perhaps, if we have any Commonwealth speakers later, it might
be worth while asking them.
At the parliamentary scrutiny level the result was mixed. We have the Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties, which is obviously a very successful body.
In some ways it seems to have taken over the functions of the Treaties Council
to the extent that it is a public forum at which the states can make
representations and matters can become public and discussed. At the other
level, though, in terms of looking for a parliamentary veto in relation to
treaties: clearly, that did not go ahead. The Commonwealth government said,
‘Let’s do all these other reforms first, and see if that fixes the problems. If it
doesn’t then we can reconsider the issue of a parliamentary veto over
treaties.’
There was a subsequent review and the conclusion was that everything was
hunky-dory so we did not need to go down the parliamentary veto path.
Although, I have to say that when I was talking to Senator Kemp last night he
said that he was a lone voice in the wilderness still proposing parliamentary
vetoes over treaties. So, within the government ranks, there is at least one
voice calling for parliamentary veto over treaties.
So that is what the states got. What do they want now? Interestingly, the
states are not calling for a veto over treaties—in fact, they are not even calling
for a parliamentary veto over treaties. From discussions with various state
representatives that I have seen, they think that is water under the bridge—an
issue that has passed by. What they are calling for is improved consultation.
There certainly have been improvements in consultations but more
improvements can be made. The main concerns seem to be about
consultations earlier on in the negotiation stage. There is a concern that
national interest analyses come too late in the piece for the states, that maybe
a draft version should be done earlier that could be used by the states so that
they could take into account that information in assessing their own positions
and feeding back to the Commonwealth before you get to the point of
fronting up to the parliament with this material.
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There is also an issue further on about implementation. There is a concern
that really what SCOT should be doing, but is not, is acting as a forum for
determining how treaties are being implemented before you get to the stage
that you are in breach of your international obligations by not implementing
them. If a treaty does have an impact upon states then some sort of agreement
should be worked on early in the piece as to whether the states will change
their legislation, or what will happen, so that it is well settled before you get
to the point of ratification as to how you will implement a treaty. That is not
being done in a systematic way; it is being done in a haphazard way. More
effort needs to be undertaken to work out earlier on in the piece what are the
potential impacts on the states and what changes need to be made at that
stage.
The other concern of the states seems to be that occasionally
Commonwealth agencies will deal directly with state line agencies so that, if it
is an environmental treaty, the department in Canberra will start dealing
directly with the environmental departments in the states because they have
established relationship. That is all very well and good but, unless it goes
through the formal process into Premier and Cabinet, the states are not able to
coordinate all the aspects of the treaty and its impact on the states. So,
although bypassing those formal mechanisms through SCOT may be seen to
be avoiding red tape, it actually ends up with more problems in the end and
is not an effective way of doing things.
My problems with this speech were twofold. One was that there was not
sufficient controversy. On the whole the states are pretty happy with the
reforms, and that is a nice thing, but it does not lend itself to an interesting
speech. My second problem was that my colleagues have already said a lot of
what I was going to say and that meant that there was not really anything
interesting to say either. So here is my one interesting point, which is a little
bit off the topic that I was asked to speak about but is still about states, the
Commonwealth and treaties.
The paradigm that we are used to in relation to treaties is the
Commonwealth wanting to enter into treaties and states being negative about
it. We are aware that states are concerned that the Commonwealth will gain a
legislative head of power by entering into a treaty and might use that power
against the states, therefore states are concerned to try to limit the
Commonwealth’s power to enter into treaties, limit the number of treaties that
it enters into or somehow respond in a negative way to treaties. The trend that
seems to be happening at the moment, though, seems to be a reverse of that. I
think that is probably the most interesting thing, looking ahead to the future.
What you are beginning to see is reluctance on the part of the
Commonwealth to enter into a treaty or to implement a treaty but finally
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some enthusiasm by the states to go ahead with implementing treaties. I give
you as an example Kyoto. The Commonwealth has not wanted to enter into
the Kyoto Protocol but some states now want to effectively implement it at a
state level. So you have states talking about establishing carbon emissions
trading systems and those sorts of things. You can see the same sort of trend
happening in places like the United States of America where California and
various other states or even some times cities are taking action to implement
the principles in the Kyoto Protocol where the federal government is not
taking the action to ratify the treaty.
You can see similar sorts of trends happening in relation to human rights.
You have the ACT with its Human Rights Act, you have proposals in Victoria
to develop a charter of rights and you have discussions elsewhere—Western
Australia and even New South Wales are beginning to think about it too. You
are looking at states beginning to use international conventions and human
rights conventions and the implementation of them as a basis for state
legislation when at the Commonwealth level—although in this case the
treaties have been ratified—the Commonwealth is very reluctant to enact its
own bill of rights or charter of rights. So you have a complete reverse of the
argument that we have been having with Tasmanian dams and all those cases
where it was a matter of the Commonwealth implementing and the states
rejecting. We have a reverse trend of that going at the moment, which I think
is a really interesting development, of states wanting to implement treaties
when the Commonwealth is more reluctant to do so. That is my one
provocative thought for you to think about. Thank you.
CHAIR (Senator Dana Wortley)—Our final speaker for this session is
Associate Professor Richard Herr. He has been teaching at the University of
Tasmania for more than 30 years, where he has held a variety of positions. He
was a cofounder of the Australasian Study of Parliament Group, which
cosponsored the 1999 seminar of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.
Richard is well known as a political commentator. You may have heard him
recently in relation to the Tasmanian state election. I invite Richard forward to
reflect on the role of state parliaments.
Prof. Richard Herr—Thank you. It is my pleasure to be here and to join my
friend Dick Adams in promoting the interests of Tasmanian salmon. I
certainly hope it is on the menu for lunch. It is a privilege to be here and to be
able to follow up on the role we were allowed through the Australasian Study
of Parliament Group in cosponsoring that 1999 seminar. I mentioned that
because it provides me with much of what I want to say. Like Anne, I am
doing something of a retrospective on what we saw in 1999 and how far or
how little we have come down the track since then.
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I would also like to use this opportunity—although our present President,
Kevin Rozzoli, who I am not speaking to because he stole the punch line from
my paper but I will try to forgive him by the end of my speech, may do this—
to congratulate JSCOT on its successes over the past decade. Certainly, it is
remarkable—even where some have pointed out limitations. We are further
down the track of transparency and accountability as a consequence of
JSCOT’s efforts than we would have been without it.
Like my students, when I have to give a presentation such as this I
immediately go to Google and see what I can find about it. I was rather
surprised when it flashed across my screen that the House of Commons in its
review of parliament’s role in treaty making made this comment:
... it is not the wish of the Government or Parliament to use treaty-making as a method to
undermine the legislative and administration autonomy of the devolved bodies.

It goes on to say that the domestic implementation, which lies within the
remit of the devolved bodies, will be retained by them in terms of their
legislative and administrative powers. I thought that was remarkable for a
system which we usually teach as being unitary and not being terribly
sensitive to it. I am not suggesting for a moment that the Australian states
have been reduced to devolved bodies of the Commonwealth but it is part of
this growing awareness that, if you are going to have treaties as legitimate
parts of the international governance processes, you do have to make them
more democratic, and we have talked about the democratic deficit issue for
some time.
The issue I want to address came from the 1999 seminar, where we had a
panel of state parliamentarians talking about the state parliamentary role in
treaties. Ray Bailey, who was then President of the Legislative Council, made
a point of distinguishing, as indeed subsequent speakers did as well, between
the state parliament’s role and the state government’s role—the state
executive. That provoked something of an interesting debate but it was not a
terribly long one. As we are getting close to lunchtime, you might be pleased
to know that that session finished early. You can go back to the seminar
transcript and find that it finished early, partly because of the wish list and
the sorts of reasons Anne has already touched on and partly because what the
state parliamentarians could envision as their role was fairly limited. I wish it
were not, and part of my talk is to try to suggest that it should not be.
One of the issues that state parliaments, as parliaments, face in trying to
find a role for themselves in the treaty making process is: where should they
intervene? The negotiating phase, the acceptance phase or at the
implementation phase? The practising diplomats have far more than just the
three phases that I have outlined here. By and large the parliamentarians are
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not interested in all of the different stages that go into making up the
negotiating stage. They tend to lump it all together. I only mention that
because I know that the practising diplomats are sensitive to the idea that
state parliaments would want to get involved at a stage which they see as
very complicated, sophisticated and sensitive in a somewhat—from their
point of view at least—ham-fisted way.
As has been mentioned many times already, treaty making is a Crown
prerogative and it has only very slowly and recently begun to be
democratised. That is important because as we look at democratising this
process it is not surprising that the major strides forward have really been
made where the treaty making process enters the domestic arena with some
degree of reality. That has tended to be at the acceptance and implementation
stages. There is also in part a practical reason why this is so. Most of the rest
of the world is not as democratic as the states that we normally associate
ourselves with and to that extent they would find it enormously
inconvenient—and I think that is why the foreign minister used the phrase
last night—to deal with overly democratic systems in terms of the negotiating
stages when they are trying to get their ducks in a row.
Like Anne, I went back to the history of it. What struck me is the fact that
what has driven this process has not been as much the democratic deficit
argument as simply straightforward Australian federalism—the tussle
between the states and the Commonwealth for control and the states trying to
find a place for themselves in that process once it became a source of political
controversy. It goes back at least some 20 years before the 1996 reforms.
Malcolm Fraser made it part of the new federalism approach that he had. I
looked at the special Premiers conference in 1997 where proposals were made
and agreed amongst the states and the Commonwealth on what the states’
role in treaty making should be. When I read them out to you, you will find it
surprising in some ways that they were as far in front of the process as they
were at the time.
There was an agreement that there would be early advice to the states on
treaty discussions and that there would be consultation with the states where
a proposed treaty affected a sphere traditionally within the control of the
states. For me, the critical thing was that it was agreed that the first option
would exist with the states for passing implementing legislation, so that the
states, if it was an area that affected the states, would have the first right to
pass implementing legislation to put the treaty into effect domestically. There
was to be the inclusion of the states in negotiating delegations, again where
the treaty affected state interests, and there was a promise to try and use the
federal clause in treaties where appropriate. As I said, I found it surprising
when I went back to look at this, to see that the states were actually going to
be given the implementing power before the Commonwealth parliament had
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that kind of substantial and organised role at its level. Of course, it did not
happen, any more than the federal clause could be inserted into treaties,
simply because it was impractical, and most non-federal states resisted
anyway.
The other thing that struck me about it, and it is a point that has been made
repeatedly thus far—and hopefully it will continue to be made, because I
think it needs to be repeated—is that the bulk of the arrangements for dealing
with treaty making and the federal processes in Australia have depended
upon the executive arm of government to carry them through. The Fraser
concessions were not, I think, grudgingly made, but there were certainly
obstacles to making them work. For example, there was to be a states
adviser—someone, usually a Solicitor-General, who would be added onto the
international negotiating teams. But there was only going to be one of them,
and that one individual was supposed to represent all the states’ interests.
Any of you have worked for state governments know the impossibility of it
ever occurring that a single state adviser could adequately put forward all the
different state interests on a difficult treaty. Moreover, just to make it a little
bit more worth while for the states to reflect on how important it was for them
to be involved in the negotiating stage of treaty making, they were told that
they would pay the costs of the states adviser. And, of course, the states
adviser would only be advisory. In effect, it was really only to be a trip-wire
to alert the states to possible interests, which presumably they would take up
through the Premiers Conference, later COAG, processes.
By and large the state parliaments have tended to focus, as the national
parliament has, on the later stages of the treaty-making process—that is to say
the implementation stage—where legislation becomes desirable or necessary
or, as others have said, amending state legislation to accommodate new
obligations that have been acquired through treaties. It was interesting to me,
however, again in looking at the 1977 special Premiers Conference
discussions, that a lot of the wish lists then were ones that were repeated at
our 1999 seminar—so they really had not been formalised more effectively or
focused or indeed advanced to any great degree.
I think the JSCOT process has done a marvellous job in carving out a role
for a more democratic treaty-making process in the areas that have already
been described, but it has not been able to extend this to the states in any sort
of practical sense. I am aware of JSCOT’s criticism of the SCOT process as not
fully representing the kind of consultation that it wanted, and I agree with it.
Part of my reason for being involved with the Australasian Study of
Parliament Group is that by and large we do not trust the executive. We
should not trust them, and they should be somehow accountable and
responsible to parliaments in an appropriate way.
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But the JSCOT process in advancing the democratic influence on the treaty
making process really did not serve as a template for the states. The states did
not embrace it as something they could then use at the state level. Although
they talked about it, a lot of the discussions in the late 1990s in the state
reviews tended to look at it as a possibility but they did not really pursue it. A
lot of the reasons for that have to do with, again, the federal process. After all,
foreign affairs is a national responsibility and, although globalisation and
other factors do impact on the states, few state members of parliament—
indeed I do not know of any—have ever made a career out of getting reelected by following an external affairs interest. My voice has gone I am sorry,
from four weeks of commenting on what went on in the hustings. I do not
know what their voices are like. None of them really dealt with external
affairs; it was not a significant factor. It certainly was not going to get them reelected and they would not get much credit if they tried to do it. It is a kind of
myopia which I wish did not exist.
It is not so much that I want the state parliaments to oversight external
affairs and be critical of the Commonwealth’s handling of it, but it is not just
the sins of commission that are important but also the sins of omission—the
number of times the states should have protected state interests and the
federal compact or looked at the opportunities in which they could have been
involved in very positively supporting federal initiatives and so on. These all
ought to be part of the mix but they do not get taken account of in any
systematic or focused way at the state level.
I agree with what Petrice said. In fact, I made the same point in 1999. Far
too few resources are devoted by the states to carrying out their
responsibilities. It struck me as the state parliamentarians were talking then
that they wanted access but very few of them were willing to offer ways they
would pay for it and commit themselves to keeping informed and providing
responsible intervention in the treaty making process.
I apologise to those of you here who were inundated by my emails asking
for advice. I sent them out just before the Premier called the state election and
immediately got distracted and did not have a chance to follow it up. From
the discussions I have had, by and large it still remains very much the case
that—and the intervention from Victoria from the floor previously made this
point—even where the states do take an interest it has not always been
maintained or followed up as governments have changed. I do not think this
has been particularly to the benefit of the states. Certainly, I agree with the
JSCOT chair that this lack of involvement has not assisted JSCOT in
understanding the mind of the states. I do not want to be too critical. As I
have already said, most state parliamentarians do not get any political
advantage to their careers in spending time on this and therefore it does tend
to go very much to the backburner.
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I want to finish on what I think the states ought to do to address some of
these problems. Before I do I want to take the opportunity to add something
to the JSCOT agenda and, hopefully, to the states’ agendas as well. That is
something, again, that the House of Commons fact sheet of the role of
parliament in treaty making drew attention to. And that was the role of
international agreements which are not in the form of a treaty—agreements
which impact hugely on states’ foreign policies but do not go through any
treaty scrutiny process because they are not written up as a treaty or dealt
with as a treaty. I do not want to push my example overly much because I
know immediately hackles will rise and people will tell me why I am wrong. I
think the antiterrorism legislation of last December is an example of
legislation that impacted hugely on civil liberties and civil rights in Australia
and on the federal compact in terms of the relationship between the
Australian Federal Police and other security interests and the state justice
systems in ways which deserve vastly more scrutiny than it got.
This may not have been totally as a consequence of antiterrorism
agreements and arrangements but was broadly argued in favour of that. It
really deserved to get the full treaty review process scrutiny because there is a
real risk in not doing so. I simply raise that as something that I think ought to
be on the agenda. There are non-treaty international agreements that do need
to be considered in some way by the parliaments—both Commonwealth and
state—that do impact on the federal contract and federal relationships as well
as on the rights and privileges of citizens in their role as citizens.
To conclude, what can the state parliaments do realistically as parliaments
in assisting JSCOT and also in carrying out what I believe are their own
obligations? The primary one is that they do need—and JSCOT has proved
this—some institutional commitment to treaty review. That means that an
appropriate parliamentary committee has got to be charged in its terms of
reference with an ongoing continuous and continuing responsibility for
oversight of these treaties. I think some of the states—and the ones that
particularly struck me were Queensland and Western Australia—do a very
good job at promoting the transparency of treaties through the efforts of the
executive branch. I have no problem with that.
But my own experience in Tasmania has been that the executive branch
often farms out their responsibilities to line agencies or to individual advisers
to help bring it all together. They miss out what a proper, duly constituted
parliamentary procedure would do. If you want a whole-of-government
approach—and by that I mean small ‘g’ government—and the whole-of-state
interest to be brought together, the JSCOT formula at the state level is the only
way it is going to happen. I think the states ought to accept that as one of their
obligations—and not try to control the process in a way which makes it
convenient for them and promotes the kind of executive federalism which is
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undermining a lot of the traditional relationships between the states and the
centre—and to advance the role of the community in getting involved in not
just the negatives of whingeing about the things they do not like in the treaty
making process but also the positives.
People have mentioned this already—the fact that if you let people know
what is happening, give them a proper explanation for it and give them a
chance to participate in the discussions about it you build support for the
treaty. That can be done and should be done to a limited extent at the
negotiating phase early on. There is no reason why preliminary hearings
could not be held on the issue. State parliamentary committees could get the
advice through those and pass it up through their own executives into the
COAG processes and directly back into JSCOT. That is important.
Similarly, in the implementation stage, which has been the more fertile area
for state parliamentary action, more polished, consistent and coherent advice
to JSCOT would be forthcoming if state parliamentary committees were
involved and promoted debate and community involvement through
parliamentary hearings on issues of importance—again not all treaties are
going to require that but the ones that do would certainly be advantaged by
this process and this involvement. I will probably leave it there, but I do think
there is a role for the state parliaments as opposed to the state governments. I
think it is their responsibility to get involved in the process. Thank you.
CHAIR (Senator Dana Wortley)—Thank you. When you mentioned that
Kevin had stolen your punch line I noticed the smiles on the faces of my
parliamentary colleagues. Often we walk into the House of Representatives or
the Senate with our speech notes all ready to go on a particular topic to find
that we are number 17 on the speaking list and by the time we get to our turn
not only has every punch line been taken, but every fact, every figure and
everything else contained in the speech has been taken. Then you have to
stand up and present it as if it is all fresh and new. So we understand how
you feel. I would like to open the discussion up for about five minutes of
questions. I will take questions for our speakers.
Mr John Langmore—I would like to underline the comment by Richard
Herr that there are many international agreements that are not in the form of
treaties that have considerable political power in most countries. In a
federation, many of those agreements require action by states in order to
implement them. At the United Nations there are many international
agreements relating to economic and social issues, goals, principles and
strategies. They tend not to be taken terribly seriously in Australia but are in
most other countries. To implement them requires the cooperation of the
states.
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Mr Michael Bliss—I am from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
This is not so much a question as a comment. As a public servant I should
avoid being controversial but I fear I may be straying into controversy here. I
am struck by the fact that with all this talk about process domestically—how
we consult and what we do to review treaties—there has been remarkably
little discussion about how treaties are actually negotiated. This is just a plea
from one of the many public servants who do go overseas and negotiate
treaties for recognition as to how difficult that process can be. We always have
at least one negotiating partner with national interests which are equally as
important to it as ours are to us and frequently we will need to make quite
difficult trade-offs in order to strike a deal. As negotiators, as we queue up at
Canberra airport with our official passports and our briefs in our secure
briefcases, we want something that is clear, that has identifiable bottom lines
and that actually gives us a mandate to negotiate.
In my experience, at least, it is very difficult negotiating with those treaties
which do have a parliamentary approval process as often—and there is one
country in particular that comes to mind—the expectations domestically as to
what is achievable on the international stage are not sometimes realistic. I
think we need to appreciate that as we talk about how changes might be
made at the domestic level because every one of those changes will have
impacts on how we are able to negotiate internationally. This is not a plea
simply for bureaucratic efficiency; it is for our international effectiveness on
the international stage.
I will close by saying that often the question seems to be: is this the best
possible treaty from Australia’s perspective? Usually the answer will be no,
but in fact the real question should be: is this, as the best achievable treaty,
one which is worth having? In the age of globalisation I think the answer to
that will usually be yes, even though it might not meet all our objectives and
desires. Thank you.
Prof. Richard Herr—I would like to respond. I did in fact say in my paper a
couple of times that the states have to be realistic in giving advice at the
negotiating stage. But having helped to draft two international treaties I still
think it is a lot better to know what kind of support you have behind you
before you start than finding out halfway through that there are some
fundamental objections and your negotiating partners are reading about them
in their newspapers while you are trying to keep a straight face and say, ‘Yes,
but we really want this and we are committed to it.’
Mrs Petrice Judge—I would like to add something. I have been on
delegations and I totally agree with Mr Bliss what a wonderful job the
Australian negotiators do. We are a small country and I think we actually
achieve more than we have any right to expect. But, if the negotiators go into
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those negotiations fully armed with the possible impact within Australia they
are much better prepared for those negotiations. We did have an example of
an agreement that was being concluded about mutual recognition in Europe
and we found out that the states had a good deal of information on that issue
that would have helped the negotiators no end. We do not want to hamstring
the negotiators; we just want to add value.
CHAIR (Senator Dana Wortley)—Our time is up. Thank you very much to
our speakers for this session. Your contribution has been most valuable. As a
new member of the committee and having only taken up my position in the
Senate in July, I have found it both informative and enlightening. Thank you.
Proceedings suspended from 12.16 pm to 1.35 pm
Session 3: New developments in treaty making and review
CHAIR (Senator Russell Trood)—Good afternoon. Like Senator Wortley, I
am a relatively recent addition to the committee, having joined on 1 July, and
I have been asked to chair this afternoon’s session. Now that our stomachs
have been fortified with food and our brains have been considerably fortified
by a very stimulating address from Greg Sheridan, I think we are prepared for
the afternoon’s activities. Just before I introduce our speakers, perhaps I could
make two quick observations. As a Queensland senator, I feel obliged to
dissociate myself from Greg Sheridan’s remark that there is similarity
between Queensland bananas and those from overseas. I would not want that
to remain on the record unchallenged.
The second thing is slightly more serious. Prior to joining the Senate, I had a
very strong interest in international affairs but I did not have a particular
interest in treaties. However, what has struck me since I joined the committee
is the range and diversity of the issues, the agreements and the treaties that
have come before the committee. Chairman Andrew Southcott spoke about
that this morning, and he gave you some sense of this diversity. A couple
more issues reinforce that sense of diversity. We have recently dealt with
putting tracers in chemical explosives and also drugs in sport, which are
clearly at different ends of some kind of spectrum and add to the range of
issues that Andrew mentioned previously.
This session is called ‘New developments in treaty making and reviews’.
We have three speakers, all of whom are well qualified to address the topic
but none more so than the first of our speakers, who will be well known to
almost everybody in this room. He is the Secretary to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Michael L’Estrange. For those who may not know
much about Michael, you can read about him in the program, but let me just
remind you very quickly, because he brings to my mind a wide range of
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experience—almost a unique experience. Michael has been overseas and
experienced treaty making from that dimension. He has also experienced
treaty making from the dimension of a very senior public servant. Michael
was a New South Wales Rhodes scholar. In the past—between 1996 and
2000—he was secretary to cabinet and head of the cabinet unit. Most recently,
prior to taking up his appointment as the secretary, he was Australia’s High
Commissioner in London. It is with great pleasure to welcome Michael to the
podium. He will address the theme of developments in free trade agreements.
Mr Michael L’Estrange—Thank you very much, Senator Trood, for your
very warm welcome. It is good to renew an association with you. I thank you
all very much for the welcome you have extended to me. I am delighted to
join you today on this occasion, which marks 10 years of the Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties. I am very pleased to accept the invitation that you
have extended to me to provide some specific comments on developments in
free trade agreements.
From the perspective of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, our
interaction with JSCOT has been positive, constructive and beneficial over the
past decade—a decade of extraordinarily intensive treaty-making
internationally and one in which for Australia, as well as for many other
countries, trade agreements have been an important dimension. This
phenomenon reflects broader trends in Australian trade policy. Australia’s
economy has become more outwardly oriented. Since 1984 Australia’s trade
intensity—that is, our exports plus our imports as a share of GDP—has
increased from 30 per cent to 40 per cent. The economic gains made by
Australia’s integration with the global economy and the reforms that
accompanied it have helped to drive faster economic growth, spur
productivity and keep inflation and unemployment low. They have also given
the economy the flexibility to withstand and ride out economic shocks. At the
same time, the international trade negotiation environment has also
transformed, particularly through the creation of the World Trade
Organisation in 1995 and the growth of bilateral and free trade agreements.
The establishment of JSCOT led to the creation of supportive arrangements
in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Treaties Secretariat in
our legal branch is now designed to liaise closely with the JSCOT secretariat
in coordinating the preparation of the treaty texts, national interest analyses
and associated documents for tabling in the parliament. DFAT’s Treaties
Secretariat provides advice to the government and, when required, to the
committee on treaty-making processes. It maintains for the parliament and for
distribution to the states and territories current schedules of all treaties under
consideration, negotiation and review. By utilising the services of the
Australasian Legal Information Institute, it provides comprehensive and free
Internet access to treaty texts and data.
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JSCOT has been an important means through which access to expert advice,
public consultation and full democratic scrutiny can be enhanced. The
parliament, through JSCOT, reviews the implications of particular treaties
with the benefits of public hearings, at which independent experts may be
examined as witnesses, with a prepared national interest analysis and with a
regulation impact statement where ever the Office of Regulation Review of
the Productivity Commission so requires.
The government’s pursuit of free trade agreements is part of a
comprehensive strategy of promoting growth through multilateral, bilateral
and regional negotiations. One core principle of the WTO and its predecessor,
the GATT, is the most favoured national principle. The MFN principle
requires that if any member grants a concession of any kind to another
member it should be extended unconditionally and immediately to all other
members. One exception to the MFN rule is when members enter into socalled free trade agreements or customs unions in which they agree to
eliminate trade barriers on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories. The drafters of the GATT decided that the advantages of a
preferential agreement that went so far as to eliminate substantially all
barriers would be deemed to outweigh the disadvantage of departing from
the MFN treatment.
With a few notable exceptions—including the Treaty of Rome, which began
the process of European economic integration, and the Australia-New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations agreement—much of the postwar period
has been dominated by multilateral trade negotiations. With the current Doha
negotiations, there have been nine rounds of negotiations since 1947. The
trend towards free trade agreements has come relatively recently but has
accelerated sharply in the last few years. It was the uncertainty concerning the
fate of the Uruguay Round between 1986 and 1994 which encouraged the
development of free trade agreements, with the North American free trade
agreement being a prominent example. The global spread of FTAs gained
pace in the mid 1990s and accelerated following the failure at Seattle in 1999
to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.
This trend towards FTAs has been particularly evident in the Asia-Pacific
region, as countries have concluded agreements within the region as well as
beyond it. The same trends have been apparent in the trade policy approaches
of the United States, the European Union and many other countries, including
developing countries. While the WTO remains Australia’s highest trade
policy priority, FTAs have become an important element of Australia’s trade
negotiating agenda. FTAs can make an important contribution to enhancing
the momentum for wider reform and liberalisation. They can also address
issues not fully dealt with in multilateral trade processes. They can build a
constituency for extending the reach of multilateral trade rules.
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Comprehensive FTAs also have the potential to deliver deeper, faster and
broader liberalisation in specific cases than through the multilateral system.
Over recent times, Australia has successfully concluded FTA negotiations
with Singapore, the United States and Thailand. During the last parliament,
JSCOT reviewed these FTAs. Australia is currently negotiating FTAs with
ASEAN, as is New Zealand, and the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and
China. Australia is studying with Japan the feasibility of a bilateral FTA, and
we are starting an expert groups process with Mexico to examine the
possibility of an FTA.
Australia’s approach to FTAs has evolved over time with the experienced
gained from the negotiation of different FTAs. The approach has always been
firmly grounded in the WTO by pursuing comprehensive trade liberalising
agreements. Australia’s FTAs need to meet four basic criteria. One, an FTA
should have the potential to deliver substantial commercial and wider
economic benefits to Australia in a shorter time frame than multilateral trade
negotiations. Two, FTAs should be fully consistent with WTO principles and
rules and, where possible, should deliver WTO-plus outcomes. Three, FTAs
should be comprehensive and deliver substantial liberalisation across goods,
services and investment and should ensure all sectors are considered at the
start of negotiations. Four, FTAs should enhance significantly Australia’s
broader economic, foreign policy and strategic interests.
Increasingly Australia’s FTAs aim to contain elements which go beyond
traditional market access barriers in goods and services to address, among
other things, government procurement, competition and investment and
trade facilitation issues such as standards and technical regulations and
quarantine arrangements. Other elements include provisions relating to the
protection of intellectual property rights, institutional arrangements, dispute
settlement and transparency. Accessions, a further feature, allow for the scope
of an agreement to be broadened to include third parties on terms and
conditions that are agreeable to all parties.
Australia’s forward FTA agenda remains a substantial one. Turning first to
the Australia-China FTA negotiations, these negotiations are based on an
MOU that sets out the key principles of comprehensiveness and single
undertaking as the basis for the negotiations. Four rounds of negotiations
have been held, but negotiations are still at an early stage of what will be a
complex and challenging process.
As the Prime Minister pointed out, when announcing in April 2005 the
decision to begin the negotiations, even without an FTA the trade and
investment relationship between Australia and China will continue to grow.
This strong and rapidly growing trade and economic relationship which
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Australia and China share has some highly complementary dimensions, and
our negotiations with China on a free trade agreement are aimed at building
on these complementarities. From Australia’s perspective, an FTA must be a
high quality, comprehensive and liberalising agreement that delivers
commercial benefits to Australian business. We are paying particular
attention to consulting widely on the Australia-China FTA. We welcome any
and every submission or comment on the FTA process, and our negotiators
spend considerable time talking to interested parties in industry and the
community. Those consultations will continue to intensify.
The decision to launch negotiations with the 10 countries of ASEAN and
New Zealand was based on a comprehensive set of published guiding
principles. Those principles underscore Australia’s ambition for a high quality
FTA with ASEAN and commit the countries concerned to negotiate an
agreement that covers trade in goods and services as well as investment,
provides for the progressive elimination of all forms of barriers to trade and
allows for full implementation within 10 years. The five negotiating rounds to
date have allowed negotiators to engage in wide-ranging information
exchanges on each country’s trade and investment regimes. Australia has
invested considerable resources in helping to improve understanding of the
commitments required from the ASEAN countries to produce a good
outcome from the negotiations. There are significant challenges in our FTA
negotiations with ASEAN. The region is marked by diverse interests and
levels of ambition, and countries are at different stages of development.
Securing binding commitments to comprehensive liberalisation will be one
key to the successful conclusion of the negotiations and the biggest challenge.
Australia and Malaysia are actively engaged in negotiations aimed at an
FTA that constitutes a comprehensive and high quality agreement that would
bring benefits to both countries. The priority that remains for Australia is to
secure such an agreement within a reasonable time frame. We have now had
three full rounds of negotiations, which have achieved real progress.
The United Arab Emirates is Australia’s second-largest market in the
Middle East. An FTA with the UAE would help protect Australia’s market
share in the short term and enhance our wider economic and trade prospects
in the Middle East in the longer term. The third round of negotiations with
the UAE last December made solid progress, and a fourth round is taking
place this week.
FTAs involve not only critical periods of negotiation and consultation but
also ongoing monitoring of implementation and inbuilt review mechanisms.
The first Singapore-Australia FTA review, held in July 2004, produced one set
of amendments, which considered and supported by JSCOT are now in force,
and a second review will take place in July 2006. The Thailand-Australia FTA
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review body, which met in Bangkok in December last year, agreed to
commence negotiations in a number of areas. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr
Vaile, cochaired the inaugural meeting of the Australia-United States FTA
joint committee in Washington on 7 March this year, which reviewed the first
year of the Australia-US FTA.
Engagement with the Australian public and business community is a vital
part of the FTA process. Australia’s approach on FTAs is informed by
extensive domestic consultations. DFAT call for public submissions and
conduct stakeholder and industry consultations in all Australian states and
territories throughout each negotiation. We also provide regular website and
email updates to interested parties.
In addition to our multilateral, bilateral and plurilateral trade negotiations,
Australia is also heavily involved in regional efforts, particularly through
APEC, to facilitate and liberalise trade and investment. However, unlike the
other negotiations I have referred to today, APEC is a voluntary process.
There are no treaties as such. APEC is not a negotiating forum like the WTO.
APEC works to reinforce the commitment to create more open and efficient
economies and to assist members in implementing appropriate policies. Its
aim is to encourage APEC members to make the decisions needed to move in
this direction and to support the multilateral process.
In conclusion, can I say that Australian trade policy will continue to be
focused on maintaining Australia’s competitive advantage in the global
marketplace. A successful Doha outcome is critically important to that
objective. So too are Australia’s strategies for liberalising trading
arrangements on a regional and bilateral level, strategies in which the
implementation of existing free trade agreements and the negotiation of new
ones are vitally significant. Australia’s existing FTAs already cover 24 per cent
of our total two-way trade, and FTAs under negotiation cover a further 19 per
cent of our two-way trade. So Australia’s FTA agenda ahead is wide ranging
and demanding, but it is one that is clearly in Australia’s national interest to
pursue in an activist, committed and consultative way. For our part, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade look forward to our continuing and
highly productive engagement with JSCOT across what we anticipate will be
a wide range of activities in relation to Australia’s FTA strategy. We
congratulate JSCOT on its first decade and we wish it well in its important
work for the future. Thank you.
CHAIR (Senator Russell Trood)—Thank you very much, Michael, for a
most insightful and valuable contribution to our discussion this afternoon.
Our next speaker is Associate Professor Greg Rose, from the Faculty of Law at
the University of Wollongong. Greg has the virtue of being not only an
academic lawyer but a lawyer who is practised in international law. He brings
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wisdom from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. He has practised
international law at the United Nations; he has been a member of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, contributing to their international
legal section; and he has also published very widely on the issues on which he
is going to speak. It is great pleasure to invite Greg to the podium.
A PowerPoint presentation was then given—
Prof. Gregory Rose—Good afternoon, everybody. We are at the middle
session of the session after lunch, but I hope that you are all keyed up for this
exciting presentation that I have prepared for you. I would first of all like to
thank Senator Trood for the introduction and to pay tribute to some persons
who have not been mentioned so far. In my past life I never had the privilege
of working with the secretariat of JSCOT, but the Treaties Secretariat in DFAT
was set up at that time and the current head of it, Jonathan Thwaites, is here;
Ruth Blunden, who was there from the very beginning, is also here today. The
person who set it up, Chris Lamb, put it together in an astonishingly quick
time. He had arrangements in place ready to be deployed if necessary prior to
the current government being elected, and he did that all with his usual
roguish humour. Congratulations, everybody, on the work that you have
done and are still doing.
I have been invited to speak on treaties with our regional neighbours. My
area of experience and expertise is marine and environmental treaties and,
more recently, international criminal law treaties. There are gaps in my
knowledge on regional treaties, so I had to do a little bit of research work, and
I am sure that there are still some gaps. The first problem was to decide what
region we live in. If we live in the Asia-Pacific, that is one of the five
geographic regions that the UN caucuses within and it covers 62 per cent of
the earth’s surface and about 65 per cent of its population. If I wanted to
narrow the presentation to something that was more manageable, the only
region that we really have a great deal in common with is New Zealand—and
that was very tempting because there would be less work involved in the
preparations. In the end I decided that New Zealand’s relationship with
Australia is so peculiar that it would be misleading to include it in a general
trends analysis—or with that we have with Antarctica and the emperor
penguins! I have restricted it to ASEAN and the Pacific Islands, sometimes
referred to as Oceania. There are 10 ASEAN members and, excluding New
Zealand, 15 self-governing Oceania neighbours.
The treaties, as I have classified them into categories and subcategories,
correspond to a relatively large degree with the way JSCOT itself divides its
treaty-making activities. If we look at the relative rates of treaty-making
activity across those sectors, almost half of all treaties relate to commercial
matters: trades, double tax agreements—which we should not mention
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because they are too boring—and investment protection, transport, postage
and suchlike. The second largest area is of the more general kinds of terms of
treaties, reviled by Greg Sheridan at lunch today, that relate to friendly
cooperation. These treaties are mostly bilateral. The multilateral treaties that I
have considered are those which are regional multilateral treaties rather than
global.
In relation to overall future trends, the bottom line is that our treaty-making
activities with our ASEAN neighbours continue to focus increasingly on
commercial matters. Specifically, we moved from a group of trade treaties
adopted in the 1970s to more free trade oriented treaties in the mid-1990s,
with something of a hiatus during the economic recession in the 1980s. But
there is also a new focus on intellectual property in some of those treaties and,
increasingly, on judicial cooperation, which relates to transfer of proceedings
in what are usually private international commercial matters.
The other area of increase in activity with ASEAN member countries is
bilateral criminal justice cooperation and enforcement. Those are the
extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties, which are a natural response
to the growth in transnational crime opportunities that globalisation presents.
In the Pacific, the picture is very different. The region that we live in is
really two different regions. Almost all the treaties are multilateral, rather
than bilateral, regional treaties. They focus on strategic matters and there will
be an increase in that area, as there is a need for multilateral cooperation to
support law and order in unstable states. There is also a longstanding and
continuing focus on natural resources treaties. In the 1980s those were mostly
environment treaties but there is now a stronger focus on fisheries
management as fish stocks come under greater pressure regionally.
I am going to look at each of these categories. First of all I will look at the
strategic activities treaties. I have defined those as concerning boundaries—
marking respect for sovereign territories so as to avoid conflicts—and defence
cooperation, by which I also mean security cooperation. As the slide I am
showing indicates, the majority of these treaties are defence treaties, with
boundary treaty making having increased lately due to renewed negotiation
with Indonesia. Most of those treaties are with ASEAN countries. Primarily,
that means Indonesia although also, recently, East Timor.
So what are the trends in relation to these strategic interest treaties? They all
concern maritime boundaries. Half of them are with Indonesia: four out of
eight, plus one that is not in force—the 1997 exclusive economic zone treaty.
Then there are the other regional countries in the Pacific with which we have
treaties: the Solomon Islands, PNG and East Timor. The treaty with East
Timor is not really a boundary treaty as such but a sharing of resources.
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Regarding countries outside of the region, we also have treaties with France
and New Zealand but they do not form a part of this survey.
In relation to the defence treaties: as we have heard a couple of times, a
great number of them are with Singapore, as we cooperate to meet
Singapore’s defence needs. There are also multilaterals that go back to the
Cold War and deal with the status of forces in respect of territories under the
five powers agreements that were adopted in the 1950s. I would not really
include the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a defence or security
treaty but rather as a friendly cooperation treaty that was necessary to secure
participation in the East Asia Summit. However, multilaterals are very much
the rule in the Pacific, where we have the Bougainville peace monitoring
treaties, the Solomon peace monitoring treaty and one bilateral treaty, which
is with Nauru on police assistance.
Natural resources activities treaties focus on two areas: environment and
fisheries. Hydrocarbons treaties are essentially about the Timor Gap, where
we have had a treaty with Indonesia, and, since, with East Timor, although
there is no boundary delimited and the resources are allocated rather than
actually managed.
I will look first at the environment and then at the fisheries treaties. You can
see from the slide I am showing that the majority of treaties over time have
been environmental, but there has been an increase in fisheries in recent years.
In contrast to the majority of our treaties, most of these are with the Pacific
countries. So when it comes to natural resources, the Pacific rules okay! We
have only one fisheries treaty and no environmental treaties with ASEAN
member states and the fisheries treaty is with Indonesia.
What are the likely trends within this area? There will continue to be a focus
on natural resources for the Pacific. Areas of emerging concern—they will, as
usual, be addressed multilaterally in the Pacific, due to the limited resources
that countries have for, and the limited utility in, bilateral treaties—are: coral
reefs; biosafety—that is, invasion by introduced marine pests or genetically
modified organisms—about which there is increasing concern; and the use of
trade measures to support environmental measures.
Within the fisheries sector, improved monitoring systems are an emerging
issue, which is evident in the Niue treaty and in the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries treaty that was recently adopted. Again, it is easy enough to
negotiate something on paper, but to actually implement it and make it work
across a vast marine space, when one has limited resources to deploy on the
water or in the air, is difficult and requires cooperative measures in the way of
satellite based vessel monitoring systems, certification of fish catch landings
in the market country and also port-state controls where fish are landed. So I
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think we are going to see those as the emerging agenda within the South
Pacific when it comes to fisheries negotiations.
In relation to the environment, the regional heydays were the 1980s and all
treaties were with the Pacific. There is one pan-regional treaty, concerning
plant protection, which ranges across the Asia Pacific. There is a tendency for
the environmental treaties in the Pacific to be driven by external influences, so
that current global political agendas, or the Greenpeace or WWF regional
offices, will often mobilise Pacific island interest. That is evident in the treaties
that have been adopted in the past, such as those on nuclear waste transport,
hazardous waste movement through the region, and drift-nets. So there are
important roles there in the multilateral secretariats that serve the Pacific
islands in their multilateral negotiations, rather than their own national
administrations for bilateral treaties.
In relation to fisheries treaties, you can see that there are some treaties that
extend beyond the Pacific for fisheries management. Examples include the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries treaty. The dominant role is that of the
Forum Fisheries Agency, a suborgan of the Pacific Forum—which used to be
called the South Pacific Forum. The only fishing treaty that we have with an
ASEAN member state is with Indonesia, which was adopted in 1992, noting
also the MOU that was adopted in 1974 for traditional Indonesian fishing
activities off the north-west coast of Western Australia. Other pan-regional
treaties are set out at the bottom of the slide, for the Indo-Pacific fisheries
commission and in relation to aquaculture for the Asia-Pacific.
The next treaties category is commercial activity related, divided into the
groupings of trade, tax and investment; transport and communications and
intellectual property. It is evident that there is a great level of activity in
making these treaties. Whereas some of the other graphs have only one or two
treaties over a decade that is not the case here. The trends indicate a peak in
double tax agreement making during the 1990s and a gradual decline in the
transport and communications related treaties, essentially because once they
have been made they do not need to be remade, for things like air services
and postal coordination. Again, most of these treaties are, as you would
expect, with ASEAN countries but, with the increased political activity and
awareness of Pacific countries following independence, they have also made a
presence.
If we move into the particular subcategories within the sector—and here my
presentation is largely descriptive rather than interpretive of the trends—we
can see that there was a decline in bilateral trade agreements during the 1980s.
There were none at all within the ASEAN region, for example. There has been
a resurgence recently, as Mr L’Estrange has explained to us, in Australian
governmental focus on FTA negotiations and so, within the region, we have
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agreements with Singapore and Thailand already bedded down. The trade
agreements in the Pacific are again mostly multilateral rather than bilateral.
Although there is a bilateral agreement with Fiji, the others relate to economic
cooperation more broadly across the region.
Concerning tax and investment, most treaties are double tax agreements.
There are only five investment protection agreements and I do not think that
we will see many more because they do not appear to be worth the paper they
are written on. Around the time that we had negotiated one with Laos—
actually it had just come into force—the Laos property and investments of the
Dale family were seized and Mr Dale was imprisoned. The agreement did not
seem to have much traction in the resolution of that problem and there have
not been many investment protection negotiations since. The slide sets out the
details as to whom we have double tax agreements with. You can see that
there are three in the Pacific and all the other agreements are with ASEAN
member countries.
This next slide illustrates transport and communications, subregionally.
Again, these treaties are mostly with ASEAN member states and most are
from the 1960s and 1970s. So those are the air services agreements and the
postal agreements. There is one pan-regional treaty, which is the Asia-Pacific
Telecommunity Treaty that was adopted in 1977. Due to the isolation of
Pacific island countries, air services agreements are important to them and
most of the agreements that commenced negotiation in the 1980s with the
Pacific are to do with air services.
The general group of friendly cooperation treaties—the second largest
group of treaty making—can be divided into science and technology, cultural
and consular, and development cooperation treaties. You can see from the
slide I am showing that there are quite a lot of development cooperation
treaties, some of them made quite latterly, and they are mostly with Pacific
island countries, which feature there from the 1990s.
Interestingly, there are no cultural, consular or scientific cooperation
agreements with Pacific island countries and most of the friendly cooperation
treaties that we have with ASEAN member countries are of longer standing.
Also, most of the agreements with ASEAN countries relate to consular and
cultural matters. This slide depicts the trends in relation to development
cooperation treaty making across the region, showing that emphasis on
friendly cooperation in the Pacific in the latter years.
Pan-regional agreements can be divided into those that are organised under
the auspices of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
based in Bangkok, which are more formal than effective, and the various
agreements that have been adopted through the Pacific Forum in relatively
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recent years. For the cultural and consular agreements, ESCAP established a
cultural centre in 1969. The other cultural and consular treaties relate to
exchange of publications, consular relations and cultural exchanges and are
all with ASEAN countries.
There are only three science and technology agreements. One of them is in
the Pacific region and the other two relate to nuclear science and
technology—those are with the Philippines and Singapore. The Pacific
agreement again is multilateral and it is a geoscience cooperation treaty, to
establish the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission, which engages in
scientific activities such as examining the seabed for hydrocarbon resources
and putting together the data for delimiting boundaries between the
countries.
I will move on now to the last general category of treaty making, law
enforcement treaties, which are divided into two subcategories: criminal
justice and judicial cooperation. We see from this slide I am showing that
judicial cooperation—meaning the business of transfer of proceedings and
recognition of judgments in non-criminal matters—form the minority of
treaties. Most of them, and relatively recently too, are criminal justice
cooperation oriented and most of them are with ASEAN member countries.
In the area of criminal justice, the increase has been especially recent. We
have adopted mutual assistance treaties in this area. For example, after the
Bali bombing, in order to enable the Australian Federal Police to investigate
evidence and provide forensic expertise in Bali, informal arrangements
needed to be reached with Indonesia. Mutual assistance treaties allow for the
parties to utilise formal channels to secure evidence, which can then be used
and presented in court proceedings to secure convictions. Transfer of
offenders is also a relatively new phenomenon and our transfer of offenders
agreements are likely to increase, I think, as efforts are made to ease the
imprisonment conditions of the Bali nine.
So, with regard to criminal justice, all are ASEAN related treaties, and the
majority are extradition treaties. In December last year, a new one was
negotiated with Malaysia, which has not entered into force yet. The same is
true in relation to mutual assistance. Interestingly, Australia has more
criminal justice cooperation treaties with its ASEAN neighbours than the
ASEAN member countries have with each other. There is an effort afoot that
has been spearheaded by Malaysia to improve ASEAN regional cooperation
in criminal matters through the adoption of a regional mutual assistance
treaty, but that has only four parties at the present time. It was mentioned that
we are negotiating a transfer of offenders’ agreement with Hong Kong. We
have one with Thailand, and I look to others in the room who might know
more about what is in the wind with Indonesia.
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For judicial cooperation, the Pacific features more highly in the survey. We
have a civil and commercial agreement with Thailand, but in the Pacific we
provide judicial cooperation for Nauru in hearing appeals. There was also
treaty action for the recognition of the settlement of the phosphates case with
Nauru in our respective jurisdictions. To bring our survey to a conclusion,
across the ASEAN and Pacific regions, which we might grandiosely call
Australasia, there is a dominating presence of treaty making with ASEAN
member states and an increasing importance in treaty making with Pacific
island countries. The lack of true integration across the east and the western
waters that surround Australia means that there are very few pan-regional
treaties that are applicable.
Among the ASEAN member states that we make treaties with, the majority
are with open economies. There is little growth in the number of treaties we
make each year, but there is a change in the trend of the kinds of treaties that
we make. There is an increasing focus on practical necessity for matters like
criminal justice, cooperation and bilateral free trade and less on symbolic
treaty making related to matters like general economic cooperation or cultural
exchange. What new directions might we see? We might see greater
integration across legal systems so as to facilitate more transnational
commercial litigation so that there will be more ready acceptance of evidence
across legal systems and transfer of proceedings.
Within the Pacific the growth will continue to be in relation to multilaterals,
rather than bilateral treaties, and the focus will continue to be on marine
resources. But the new direction that is emerging is the support of law and
order within Pacific island countries, most of which are multilateral
arrangements rather than bilateral, lending a patina of legitimacy rather than
imperialism to the interventions that might be necessary. That is a very broad
perspective and, I am sure, not without its flaws. I thank you for giving me
your time.
CHAIR (Senator Russell Trood)—Thank you very much, Greg, for
providing that most interesting account—exploring the range of treaty actions
that have been undertaken with our neighbours. Thank you also for the visual
aids, which are always valuable after a very substantial lunch.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is with very great pleasure that I introduce the
third of our speakers this afternoon—Aynsley Kellow—particularly because
Aynsley was a colleague of mine at Griffith University before he sadly
decamped and went to Tasmania, where he took up the chair of Professor of
Government at the University of Tasmania and where he has continued,
essentially, his life’s work as an academic, exploring the intersection between
international relations and environmental policy on a broad scale. In that
context Aynsley has undoubtedly established an international reputation. I
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doubt that we could have a better person to join us this afternoon to speak on
issues of climate change in relation to treaty making than Aynsley Kellow.
You will have noticed, perhaps—it certainly caught my eye—that he has
published widely in this area. One of his more recent publications has the
catchy title The Greenhouse and the Garbage Can: Uncertainty and Problem
Construction in Climate Policy. I am not quite sure that that is the quite the
theme today, but it is certainly related. Aynsley, you are most welcome.
Prof. Aynsley Kellow—Thank you, Russell, for that generous introduction.
I also thank the committee for inviting me to address this seminar, which I
have found fascinating and has certainly set a very high standard for me to
follow. I thank particularly the staff of the committee, who have run the show
like a very well oiled machine; everything has gone very smoothly. If you
have ever organised a conference or a seminar, you know that it is something
you should do only once, but, clearly, they do it more than once and do it
very well.
I share with Dick Adams a deep and abiding interest in Tasmanian salmon,
not the least because a colleague and I have a research project which is
looking at the way in which Australia’s obligations under the sanitary and
phytosanitary agreement trickle down and are applied within a federal
system. I was pleased to explore that interest in a more gastronomic sense last
night, with at least some salmon on the menu.
Australia has seemingly long had a problematic relationship with
conventions to do with climate change. I can remember a story, probably not
apocryphal but perhaps an omen, that the then minister for the environment,
Ros Kelly, almost signed the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 on behalf of Afghanistan. Mrs
Kelly’s slip was attributable, perhaps, to her being used to Australia
appearing first in the alphabetical listings. But the incident thus pointed to a
feature of the framework convention that has now become commonplace in
multilateral environmental agreements, or MEAs, and which has called into
question the value of the particular approach to negotiation followed with the
framework convention and the Kyoto Protocol to it—the accession to MEAs of
parties such as Afghanistan which are exempted from many of their
provisions. Double standards help build support but undermine effectiveness.
While we would all agree that Afghanistan should not be burdened—it has
enough burdens to deal with and should not be burdened with obligations on
climate change—we need to point out that that division between industrial
nations and developing nations is one which goes back all the way to about
1962. Excluded from obligations applying to industrial states are also states
like Singapore, which happens to be the largest per capita emitter of
greenhouse gases globally, something that is often overlooked.
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It seems to me that the brief history of agreements on climate change serves
as a useful indicator of the worth of institutions such as the Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties, the 10th anniversary of which we are here to
celebrate. This is because the interesting scholarship on MEAs is now focused
less on the processes by which they are negotiated and more on the processes
by which they are translated into effective policy outcomes—or not. MEAs are
part of what Stanley Hoffman once referred to as ‘low politics’—international
regulatory regimes, rather than the high politics which surrounded matters of
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The agreements resulting from low
politics require much more action by national governments than those of high
politics. They require not only ratification, as described by Puttman in his
description of two level games, but the adoption and effective implementation
of policy by those who become parties. Especially in a federal system, this
means games at multiple levels and across multiple agencies.
Effective implementation by all parties, and thus successful outcomes, can
by no means be taken for granted. It was once said in the context of the
European Union that those first to agree were often the least likely to
implement. That danger persists in the multilateral system, and what has
been referred to as the vertical disintegration of policy is a constant risk. It is
not just the vertical but the horizontal coordination of policy responses that is
important. For example, while the environment directorate of the commission
of the European Union remains enthusiastic about the Kyoto protocol, the
energy directorate continues to find it necessary to subsidise the production
of coal.
As a middle power, as the familiar line goes, Australia has an overriding
interest in a rules based system and therefore tries to implement what it
agrees to and, as a consequence, is careful about what it agrees to. It is this,
when coupled to its political economy as the world’s largest exporter of coal
and a significant exporter of coal based energy and processed goods, which
has made for a problematic relationship between Australia and international
climate treaties.
There are now three agreements. Australia is a party to one, the framework
convention; has signed but not ratified another, the Kyoto protocol; and has
played a lead role in developing the third, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate, or AP6. The scorecard on these is mixed.
The framework convention has largely succeeded as a first step; Kyoto, in my
view, has failed; and AP6 holds much promise but requires much more flesh
to be added to a very promising skeleton. This raises questions for JSCOT,
although I notice that at lunch the chair indicated that there might be some
scrutiny by JSCOT of AP6. I will say some more about that later. Some will
find my scoring on all three of these contentious, but I would say that the
framework convention both provides a useful framework and did provide a
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relatively non-specific goal of collective stabilisation of industrial nations’
emissions of CO2 at 1990 levels by 2000, which in fact was largely met. It has
some problems, however, not least of which are the laying down of some
structural elements which I think doomed Kyoto and an unfortunate
definition of ‘climate change’ that is at odds with that used by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Kyoto, I think, has failed. It is now a paradigm case of how the very features
used to speed up multilateral negotiations—double standards provisions,
creative ambiguity, iterative functionalism, epistemic consensus and so on—
can both undermine the effectiveness of MEAs and yet still fail to bring along
those whose actions are vital to success. The US was not likely to ratify and it
has been clear to all since the tenth Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires
that India and China have rejected Kyoto or any similar successor as a way
forward which might see them agree to limit future emissions growth.
The communiqué from the G8 meeting last May also contained a grim
portent for Kyoto, because it made only one reference to Kyoto—some largely
face-saving language that those with obligations under Kyoto would honour
them—and then flagged the framework convention as providing the basis for
future action. The problem with Kyoto obligations is that those who have
accepted them are unlikely to meet them and probably will not come close
unless through policies not closely related to climate change and fortuitous
circumstances such as those related to the selection of the 1990 base year,
which was so propitious for the United Kingdom and Germany and thus,
through the burden sharing agreement, for the European Union.
Ironically, Australia, which refused to ratify, might come closest to meeting
its target. Even if targets are met, concessions to Russia on trading hot air to
secure entry into force will mean Kyoto will be an expensive exercise that will
achieve little discernible result. Kyoto was widely touted as a first step but it
now looks like a stumble in the wrong direction. It lacks moral credibility by
requiring least of those with the greatest responsibility for the current state of
the atmosphere—it just happened to be the United Kingdom and Germany, as
the Brazilians were unkind enough to point out with their proposal during
the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate.
AP6, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, is a
recognition of several mistakes with Kyoto. Firstly, it is an exercise in what we
can refer to as minilateralism, which should minimise the problems of
negotiations moving at the speed of the slowest ship in the convoy, and the
effect of the lowest common denominator and other approaches which
diminish the quality of what might be agreed. It runs the danger of falling
victim to its success as more parties want to join. I think the prospects are that
the Canadians certainly might be interested—they are so far off their target;
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they have a new government. There are also other processes, including one
centred around the G8 which I understand Australia has some involvement in
as well, which also provide some promise. But AP6 brings together in the six
parties it involves those responsible for about half of global GDP, half of
global CO2 emissions and half the world’s population. It promises, therefore,
to allow a much tighter, smaller scale negotiation with less requirement to
spend the hours that we saw reference to, I think, this morning in determining
whether the word ‘orange’ should be changed to ‘amber’, which we all know
slows down, bogs down international negotiating processes.
Secondly, AP6 reflects an alternative problem construction consistent with
that advanced by James Hansen, often regarded as the father of global
warming. The Hansen alternative scenario suggests that no regrets and lowcost options to mitigate emissions of CO2 should be followed, but so too
should action on several other forcing agents that collectively are just as
important as CO2 but which could be mitigated much more technically easily,
much more cost effectively or with substantial co-benefits. An example of the
last of these is action to clean up carbon soot from inefficient biofuel
consumption, and indoor air pollution—perhaps the worst of all
environmental problems in countries such as India—would simultaneously
be improved.
Thirdly, AP6 is a better fit for the material interests of the region, because it
reflects the resource endowments of the parties. Australia is a small but
significant player in the partnership, but its interests in clean coal are
important and matched by China and India. It is fanciful to think that China
and India will forgo their substantial coal resources as they grow their
economies over the next century. The impact of those decisions will depend
crucially upon technologies relating to both efficiency and carbon capture and
storage. Europe has a different perspective. Most of its coal and, some would
argue, all of its cheap coal has been mined, and it is now dependent on gas,
especially Russian gas, and ultimately nuclear energy, though probably
nuclear energy generated in jurisdictions where siting is less problematic than
in Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom. AP6 suits the Asia-Pacific;
Kyoto suited Europe.
Fourthly, it is now recognised that Kyoto moved too quickly to establish
targets and timetables—and we can note in this regard that the United
Kingdom is having second thoughts about its targets, having failed this very
week to meet them. The differential cost became apparent too early so that the
veil of vagueness, which can help negotiations, was lifted too soon. AP6 is
based more upon voluntary commitments, so commitment to action has been
easier to initiate. It might ultimately require price elements—I suggest it
probably does—to place a value on emitting to be fully effective, but there is
no need yet to frighten the horses. I think that is something that is likely to
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evolve as shared understanding of problems and approaches evolves within
the potential regime.
Finally, AP6 has sought from the outset to engage business. Business has to
be part of the solution because it is undeniably part of the problem. Even the
framework convention marginalised business. A business representative
pointed out to me that at one point the secretariat of the framework
convention expected a single industry voice through the International
Chamber of Commerce—ironically, while granting separate voices to Climate
Action Network Europe and Climate Action Network North America.
Business is divided by this issue. The interests of gas, and thus oil; nuclear;
renewables; coal; and energy consuming industries all diverge. So to expect
global business to speak with a single voice was to ensure that it would say
little, would disengage from the global arena and contest the issue in the
domestic arena—the most powerful cause of the vertical disintegration of
policy.
It is fair to say also, however, that this involvement of business raises some
questions about AP6 as an approach. We heard some reference this morning
to the consultation that takes place before negotiating sessions. States are
frequently represented on delegations to international negotiations, so it
raises some questions about the ways in which state governments are
consulted and brought into that process.
Much remains to be done to realise the promise of the Asia-Pacific
partnership. The fact that we have worked our way towards it through the
failure of the Kyoto process shows the value of institutions like the Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties in assisting to conduct the deliberative
conversation over whether any treaty is in the nation’s interest. That
conversation has also been conducted in other institutions, including the
executive branch of government and the fourth estate, although I must
confess I remain disappointed with the quality of the contribution of the
media to the debate within Australia. With some notable exceptions,
particularly Paul Kelly, it has usually been content to round up the usual
suspects and give them their voice rather than conduct any serious sceptical
and critical analysis of the subject. I will say as an aside that I get annoyed at
the lack of education about the basics of treaties and have given up writing to
newspapers pointing out, when they say Australia is deliberating over
whether it should sign the Kyoto protocol, that it has actually already signed
it and we are talking about ratification. Editors do not like these sorts of
letters, it would seem.
The JSCOT hearing on Kyoto, coming even before the modalities of the
protocol had been fully identified, provided a useful way in which Australia
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could have a more serious conversation about a complex and controversial
measure. Just as intergovernmental negotiations in a federal system tend to
promote executive federalism, so too do intergovernmental processes at the
international level enhance the competence of the executive—and the
Commonwealth executive, at that, in a federation. Scrutiny by JSCOT can
therefore be seen as having contributed to the process by which we have come
to place our faith in the mini lateralism of AP6, an experiment that might
prove valuable for future negotiations if it were then expanded into a widerreaching agreement. It has also helped maintain the relevance of the
parliament in an age when some of its traditional roles are in question.
As I said earlier, Andrew Southcott indicated that the committee is going to
take an interest in AP6. One of my concluding questions, before he stole my
thunder at lunch—Richard Herr also partly stole this point from me—was
going to be what role the treaties committee might play in international
agreements that are not formal treaties. This is a question that applies not just
to agreements like AP6, which might eventually, once we get the evolution of
a good regime that is based on a clear understanding of how to deal with
these problems—and I suggest it is not likely to happen in the next five
years—lead to a treaty. But the treaty by that stage will have so many of its
elements decided and determined that, if JSCOT does not involve itself until
five or more years down the track, its role will be diminished. But it is a
question that applies equally to a number of other agreements that occur in
various ways, including—flowing on from another research interest looking
at Australia’s interactions with the OECD—bodies like the OECD. I think
there was also a mention this morning of decisions made by United Nations
bodies. The OECD certainly can make decisions of its council that are binding
on members. I am not sure whether JSCOT has taken within its interests that
sort of activity, which nevertheless establishes binding commitments for
Australian governments.
CHAIR (Senator Russell Trood)—Thank you very much, Aynsley. As you
will have noticed, all the speakers from the committee today have emphasised
the fact that all of the committee’s deliberations try to take place in a
bipartisan way. Speaking as a government senator, I thank you for your very
sound and clear exposition of the relative merits of Kyoto versus AP6. Ladies
and gentlemen, we will have five to 10 minutes of questions, comments or
criticisms. That should provide you with an opportunity in relation to this
session.
Dr June Verrier—Michael, you reassured us that our efforts in the
negotiation of FTAs do not come at the expense of our commitment to
multilateral obligations and agreements. I have two questions. Is it not
possible, though, that the diplomatic and bureaucratic effort that goes into
FTAs could have the unintended consequence of neglect of multilateral
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negotiations and commitments, on the one hand? The second question is: is it
not also possible that terms and conditions of individual FTAs might
compromise us or tie our hands behind our backs in negotiating at the
multilateral level?
Mr Michael L’Estrange—I have now been in this position for just over 15
months and, from my personal experience, I think your concerns on the first
count are not warranted in terms of what I have seen at first hand. The
intensity that is applied to the WTO negotiations I think reflect the priority
that the government accords to them, particularly in the last six or nine
months as we can see this process reaching a critical point, and that point is
not very far off. It is not just an intensity and creativity of thought; it is
actually the physical demand of the meetings themselves which are constant.
I do not believe that there is a concern that the pursuit of particular FTA
negotiations, which have their own intensity and their own rhythms, are such
that it diminishes or detracts from the effort that we are committing to WTO. I
think that effort is at maximum levels and will continue to be applied because
the stakes are so high—and I do not think anyone has any illusions about that.
On the second point, in relation to individual FTAs and tying our hands, I
think we have been scrupulous over recent years in the WTO-consistent tests
that we apply to our FTAs. One of the issues at the moment is the extent to
which the WTO itself can improve the quality of FTAs being negotiated.
There are some discussions going on within the WTO, for instance, on greater
definition of its tests of comprehensiveness, and we are actively involved in
those. But, for our own part, I think we have taken those tests extremely
seriously in terms of WTO consistency, and I would be confident that none of
the FTAs we have negotiated which I have referred to have really tied our
hands in ways that will reverberate against us. I know that commitment
remains rock solid.
Mr Kevin Rozzoli—I have a quick question of Aynsley. You mentioned at
the end of your talk that, if JSCOT delayed its deliberations on treaties,
regardless of whether it is Kyoto or the other one, for five years, its role would
be greatly diminished. Does that just mean that, if they did nothing, we
would save ourselves all the trouble of the expense of looking at it, or did you
really mean to say that they would need to cut into the process more quickly,
because we could actually gain a lot from JSCOT’s participation in the process
to put us in a better position in five years time than we would be if they stay
outside the process until the traditional time they would come in?
Prof. Aynsley Kellow—What I am suggesting is that there is more likely to
be a kind of democratic buy-in if an institution is established to provide a
means of the public understanding what is at stake, what the process is and
why it is being pursued. Having its say right from the beginning is probably
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likely to produce a better level of satisfaction with the product. Inasmuch as
that is an important role that the committee performs, that is probably
preferable.
I note that, when JSCOT conducted its inquiry into Kyoto, I am not sure that
anyone—or anyone meaningful—had ratified Kyoto at that stage, because the
modalities were not really finalised until quite late in the piece. I think it was
really COP6 before important details were available. So people would not
really know what they were signing up for had they thought about ratifying
before those details were filled in. A lot of concessions were made to get
Russia on board.
One of the problems from the point of view of the importance of the veil of
vagueness that helps people sign onto things is that, if it then turns out that
what you thought was vague has embedded within it things that are to your
particular disadvantage relative to other parties, then that is a source of
failure in both the breadth of acceptance and the enthusiasm for honouring
commitments that parties are taking on. Only once Kyoto entered into force
did we really know, thanks to the extent of provision for trading Russian hot
air as well as European hot air within the burden sharing agreement, whether
it was worth taking on because its effectiveness by that stage had been so
much undermined by what was traded away to get it to enter into force.
I think our situation now is that yes, we might gain in some ways by
becoming a party and taking part in international emissions trading, but to
what end? It would certainly involve some costs for other sectors of our
economy and it would make an infinitesimal difference to the level of
greenhouse gas emissions and on possible global warming by 2100. So it is a
different picture once all of that is played through, once it has entered into
force and we know what has really been agreed to. That is a good reason why
that consideration by JSCOT in 2002 was not, in that sense, premature—
because as a society it helped us have a conversation about what was
involved and whether we should accede to it.
CHAIR (Senator Russell Trood)—I thank the panellists very much for a
most stimulating session directly after lunch. I think it has been very valuable
indeed. Thank you, gentlemen, for your attendance.
[3.02 pm]
Session 4: Perspectives from abroad
CHAIR (Mr Kim Wilkie MP)—This session is entitled ‘Perspectives from
abroad’ and we have a number of speakers. Firstly we have Dr Palitha
Kohona, who is a special adviser to the President of Sri Lanka on the peace
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process and was from 1995 until 22 March 2006 the Chief of the Treaty Section
of the Office of Legal Affairs at the United Nations. Dr Kohona has a Bachelor
of Laws with honours from the University of Sri Lanka, a Master of Laws
from the Australian National University and a PhD in international economic
law from Cambridge. Prior to joining the Treaty Section of the United
Nations, Dr Kohona worked for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, where among other things he was posted to Geneva and
subsequently appointed Head of the Trade and Investment Section. Some of
Dr Kohona’s recent publications include The role of non-state entities in the
making and implementation of international norms, The International Rule of Law
and the United Nations and Reservations: Discussion of Recent Developments in the
Practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as Depository of Multilateral
Treaties. I was talking to Kohona last night over dinner, and he was telling me
that we think we have problems having looked at 365 treaties. The United
Nations has something like 50,000.
We also have Dianne Yates MP, who is the Chairperson of the Foreign
Affairs Defence and Trade Committee in the New Zealand Parliament. She
has been a member of the Labour Party since the 1970s and a member of the
New Zealand Parliament since 1993 after standing successfully as the Labour
Party candidate for Hamilton East. Prior to parliament, Ms Yates was a
secondary teacher for 16 years and, among other things, worked as a
continuing education officer at the University of Waikato. Please welcome our
speakers. You will notice that other people are up here as well. Dianne has
some people from the New Zealand Parliament here and will introduce those
people to us. Please welcome Dr Palitha Kohona to the microphone.
Dr Palitha Kohona—Thank you for that introduction, Chair. I take this
opportunity to thank Dr Andrew Southcott for having invited me to this
event today. It was fortuitous that I was passing through Canberra on the way
to my new post. I congratulate the secretariat for having done a wonderful job
in organising this event.
A PowerPoint presentation was then given—
Dr Palitha Kohona—I would like to talk about recent developments in
treaty law, especially from the perspective of the Secretary-General as
depository of multilateral treaties. I noted that the Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade referred to the developments that
have occurred in the area of treaty law with regard to Australia, specifically in
the area of trade. My old colleague, Greg Rose, talked mostly about bilateral
treaties relating to Australia in recent times and Professor Kellow made some
very interesting, challenging and thought-provoking comments about treaties
relating to climate change.
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I have had the privilege of observing recent developments in treaty law
because some of the major developments have occurred in New York and in
Geneva and I was fortunate to be the head of the Treaty Section of the United
Nations, which gave me a particularly advantageous position from which to
observe these developments. I can also—having listened to Greg Sheridan
during lunch—assure you that neither I nor any of my colleagues have ever
imposed a treaty on anybody. I know there are some treaty bodies established
under treaties which monitor compliance with these treaties, but the members
of these treaty bodies are actually elected by the sovereign states who are
parties to these treaties. The members of those bodies are not faceless
bureaucrats from New York or Geneva. So rest assured: contrary to the
popular belief that there are some faceless people imposing a global regime
on unsuspecting Australians, it does not happen.
The Secretary-General is the depository of over 500 multilateral treaties.
That number continues to grow on almost a monthly basis. These treaties
cover almost the entire spectrum of human interaction and international
interaction, whether it be human rights, humanitarian affairs, disarmament,
trade, communications, commodities, outer space, the seas, the environment
et cetera. If there is an area which affects human beings, there is likely to be a
treaty in that area which is deposited with the Secretary-General. The Treaty
Section of the United Nations maintains a website which details the texts, the
participation status and other details on these treaties. Amazingly, this
website receives over 1.8 million hits per month. In some months the number
of hits exceeds 2 million. I sometimes wonder what people do at night when
they have insomnia: they are probably reading treaties.
One could say there is very little that happens in our daily lives which is not
underpinned by some treaty provision or other. We do not stop to spare a
thought about it. Every time you make a telephone call overseas, every time
you get on an aeroplane, every time you post a letter, every time you mail an
article to some destination overseas, there are likely to be one or more treaty
provisions that guarantee that the act you have undertaken at this end is
effectively completed. In fact, it could be argued that modern commerce could
not have achieved the levels it has reached today if not for the underlying
framework of treaties that supports it.
In addition to these treaties, which have had an impact on the development
of treaty law, one has to remember that the international community has
grown as well. In 1946 there were 51 members of the international
community. Today there are 191 members of the United Nations. In addition,
there are countries which are not members of the United Nations. The
multiplicity of treaties, with their different requirements, and the expanded
global community, with its diverse needs, has had a significant influence on
developments in international treaty law.
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There is another aspect that some of the speakers referred to this morning—
that is, the increasingly intrusive impact of many treaties on the lives of
individuals and on the business activities of corporations. This is a fact of
modern life, whether it is in the area of human rights, the environment, labour
standards et cetera. Multilateral treaties are increasingly impacting on the
lives of individuals and on the business activities of corporations. Therefore,
in that context, I should note that bodies like JSCOT play a vital role, because
if these treaties are going to impact on our lives and our work, it would seem
only natural that we should have some input into the development of these
treaty provisions and to their eventual implementation.
The multiplicity of treaties deposited with the Secretary-General has also
created the foundation for the expansion of the international rule of law. I
would like to quote the Secretary-General when he observed in 2000:
The expansion of the rule of law in international relations has been the foundation of much of the
political, social and economic progress achieved in recent years. Undoubtedly, it will facilitate
further progress in the new millennium.

Furthermore, he said:
The new millennium is the appropriate occasion to reaffirm the primary objectives of our
Organisation and focus on them anew. Establishing the rule of law in international affairs is a
central priority.

It could be argued that the international rule of law as we know it today is
underpinned to a substantial extent by the framework of treaties deposited
with the Secretary-General. Let me discuss some of the details.
The word ‘treaty’ is misunderstood at times. But, as far as the secretariat of
the United Nations is concerned, the term ‘treaty’ is defined to mean an
instrument concluded between two entities capable of concluding treaties,
and such instrument must create enforceable rights and obligations at
international law. The entities that are capable of concluding treaties are
governments and international organisations with that particular capacity.
Even when a company—however big it might be—enters into an agreement
with a state, that agreement would not be a treaty as far as we are concerned,
as far as international law is concerned, because only states or international
organisations with the appropriate capacity are able to conclude treaties.
There are some entities in the global community that may be described as
states. In fact, they claim to be states themselves, but neither the SecretaryGeneral nor the organisation recognises these entities as states. Taiwan is an
example. Taiwan might possess many of the characteristics—or even all the
characteristics—of a functional state, but the organisation does not recognise
it as a state. A treaty could be described in any number of ways—it could be
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called a convention, an agreement, an MOU, an exchange of notes—under
different names. But what is important is that, to be considered a treaty, an
instrument must meet the criteria which I described earlier. The
characterisation adopted by the negotiating parties is not important.
We should pause for a moment here to consider the role of the SecretaryGeneral as depository. The Secretary-General’s role is defined by law. He is
guided by the relevant provisions of each treaty deposited with him. Article
77 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1961 elaborates on the role
of the depository. Then, of course, there is the practice of the SecretaryGeneral himself, which predates the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties 1969 and which has evolved in certain respects since the adoption of
the Vienna convention. There are also the underlying rules of customary
international law.
The Secretary-General, as depository, provides advice and assistance
relating to the conclusion of treaties, particularly relating to the conclusion of
final clauses of treaties. He also provides interpretations of final clauses.
These interpretations have contributed to the development of treaty law. In
interpreting final clauses, the Secretary-General plays a cautiously proactive
role, and this proactive part of his role has become more significant in recent
times. For example, where the final clauses of a treaty prohibit reservations,
he would refuse to accept in deposit a statement that is a reservation or is
tantamount to a reservation. I think Australia was involved in a discussion
concerning this issue in connection with the statute of the International
Criminal Court. I recall the discussions that took place, which lasted almost a
day, in which we agreed to introduce additional wording into the declaration
that Australia made on becoming a party to the statute of the ICC, in order to
ensure that the declaration that was made did not constitute a reservation in
actual fact.
The Secretary-General has also refused to accept a notification of
denunciation of a human rights treaty. The example I have in mind is the
denunciation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by
North Korea in 1996. After having been miffed about a report issued by the
human rights commission, North Korea gave notice of withdrawal from the
ICCPR. The ICCPR, of course, has no provision on withdrawal, so, after
taking into account the provisions of the ICCPR and also the relevant
provisions of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, the SecretaryGeneral, as depository, circulated a note suggesting that the DPRK’s
notification of withdrawal was not valid. It was a risky note because the
depository does not normally take that sort of proactive step in relation to
actions undertaken by a sovereign state. But in this case, 29 states wrote to the
Secretary-General endorsing the approach that he took. The result was that,
after about two years, North Korea quietly started submitting its reports
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without ever referring to the notice of withdrawal that it had submitted in
1996.
Then again we had a major engagement relating to the readmission of
Yugoslavia to the United Nations in 2001. You will recall that the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up in 1992. There were five new
entities, but one of those entities—Serbia-Montenegro, which styled itself as
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—notified the Secretary-General that it
intended to continue the legal personality of the socialist federal republic. In
that manner, it continued to undertake treaty actions with regard to many
treaties deposited with the Secretary-General. Of course, this notification,
although recognised by the Secretary-General, was objected to by many
countries. I believe that even Australia was one of the countries that objected
to this notification.
In 2002, as a result of much political pressure and the changes that occurred
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia changed its mind and went
back on the statement that it made in 1992 and decided to rejoin the UN as a
new member and succeed to many of the treaties that the socialist federal
republic had been a party to previously. Of course, this created endless
problems for the depository, because there were treaty actions undertaken
between 1992 and 2002 which had resulted in various legal rights and
obligations. After much deliberation and extensive consultations with the
interested parties, we came up with a series of proposals which the new
Yugoslavia complied with. In fact, in one day, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia undertook 243 treaty actions. All of them were successions to
treaty actions undertaken by the socialist federal republic prior to 1992. In the
case of two treaties—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide—it acceded. In the case of the climate change convention, the
problem was that the federal republic, which had become a party to the
climate change convention, was not eligible to undertake such action. Only
members of the United Nations were eligible to become a party to the climate
change convention. After its readmission to the UN in 2002, it acknowledged
that it had not been a party to the UNFCCC between 1992 and 2002, and it
acceded to the convention. In the case of the genocide convention, there was
the small matter of the genocide case lodged against the federal republic by
the other succeeding states to the socialist federal republic before the
International Court of Justice. That matter, I believe, is still before the court.
One might ask why the Secretary-General at times takes this proactive
approach to his functions as depository. I would suggest that there are a
number of reasons for this. There is a need to maintain integrity of the
multilateral treaty system. As I said before, there are over 500 multilateral
treaties and, if the 191 members of the United Nations family were to do
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whatever they pleased with these treaties, there would be much uncertainty at
an international level. It is desirable that, at least in certain cases, the
depository becomes proactive. Unlike at a time when there were only a few
members of the international community, it is no longer feasible for each
member to take their own approach to the treaties deposited with the
Secretary-General. The Secretary-General also has a responsibility to the
international community. In this respect, he discharges his responsibility with
a great deal of caution and impartiality.
It is in the area of reservations and declarations that I have noticed the most
proactive initiatives on the part of the Secretary-General as depository. For
example, traditionally in the Secretary-General’s practice, only the head of
state or government or the foreign minister could formulate a reservation,
because it is acknowledged that only the same authorities who can undertake
a treaty action can formulate a reservation. Therefore, the Secretary-General
would not normally allow a permanent representative of a member state of
the United Nations to lodge a reservation to a treaty to which that state is a
party. However, in order to facilitate or make life easier, he has permitted
certain permanent representatives who possess what are known as ‘general
full powers’ to undertake specified treaty actions, including the formation of
reservations. There are only two countries which use this facility: the United
Kingdom and China. In these cases, their permanent representatives possess
‘general full powers’ and these PRs can lodge reservations to the treaties to
which those countries are party in their own name. It is also interesting to
note that the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission,
Professor Pellet, endorses this approach as a practice developed by the
Secretary-General.
There is also the question of the time for formulating reservations. Under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, reservations can be
formulated only at the time of signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty. However, in order to comply with this strict requirement,
certain countries have actually denounced treaties in order to reaccede with
reservations. There were the interesting cases of Guyana and Trinidad and
Tobago. Both of them, confronted with a law and order situation in their
countries and also with politically sensitive issues relating to the imposition of
the death penalty, denounced the optional protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and reacceded with reservations. From
a human rights perspective, this action has come under a fair amount of
criticism—in fact, if you go to the UN treaty collection website you will see
that there are many objections to the actions undertaken by Trinidad and
Tobago and Guyana. Nevertheless, they went ahead and did what they did.
In the case of Guyana, it stayed on as a member of the optional protocol with
its reservation. However, Trinidad and Tobago—which was confronted with
a situation where the human rights committee actually ignored its
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reservation—denounced the optional protocol a second time. So what the
human rights committee did resulted in a situation where now the optional
protocol has one member less.
Another interesting situation which has come up relates to territorial
exclusions. There are some states which, on becoming party to treaties, have
adopted the practice of excluding their territories from the application of the
treaty. Examples are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, New
Zealand and, in some cases, China. In all these cases, the exclusions relate to
non-metropolitan territories in the case of the United Kingdom, or distant
island territories. In the case of China, the exclusions invariably relate to Hong
Kong and sometimes also to Macau.
Of course this practice has been heavily criticised by certain academic
writers because, under article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a state becomes party to a treaty on behalf of all its territories and if it
excludes a part of its territory then that would be tantamount to a reservation.
This practice has been adopted even in the case of those treaties which
prohibit reservations. However, I should note that the Secretary-General has,
since 1973, accommodated this practice on the basis that it is a practical
necessity. In the case of many of these distant territories, there may be a need
to consult the local legislatures or local administrations. Sometimes it is
simply not practical. So the more appropriate approach is for these countries
to become party to these treaties after excluding these non-metropolitan
territories.
There is also a question relating to treaties that are silent on reservations.
The Secretary-General has received a huge number of reservations with
regard to those treaties, especially the human rights treaties which are silent
on reservations. Of course, such reservations must be consistent with article
19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. One of the conditions
under article 19 is that reservations should be consistent with the object and
purpose of a treaty. Any such reservation will be presumed to be accepted by
the other parties to the treaty unless a party objects to that reservation. This
presumption causes a major concern for some of the smaller countries,
because we circulate literally dozens of reservations on an annual basis and
some of the smaller countries simply do not have the resources to examine
each of these reservations to determine whether they are consistent with the
object and purpose of a given treaty.
Professor Pellet, the rapporteur to the International Law Commission on
reservations has suggested that, in this instance, the depositary has a role to
play, which is basically to draw the attention of the countries concerned to the
fact that a statement lodged could be a reservation that is inconsistent with
the object and purpose of the treaty concerned. However, although this
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suggestion has received the endorsement of quite a number of small states, it
has been objected to by the bigger states, which tend to follow the traditional
approach to treaty making and reservations—that reservations are a
prerogative of sovereign states themselves.
The question arises as to who should have the right to determine whether a
reservation is consistent with the object and purpose of a treaty. At times
human rights bodies have taken this role upon themselves and this initiative
of the human rights bodies has run into a barrage of opposition from some of
the major states, such as the United Kingdom, France, the US, India et cetera. I
mentioned the suggestion of the special rapporteur that this is a role that can
be played by the depositary. Again, that has not been received with much
enthusiasm by those major states. The state parties can continue to preserve
that role. The problem with this, as I mentioned, is that some of the smaller
states do not have the resources to examine every single note that is circulated
to determine whether the note constitutes a reservation that is objectionable.
Maybe there is a role for the human rights bodies to play in the case of human
rights treaties, which is that they could, within the 12 months permitted for
objections to be lodged, draw the attention of the parties concerned to the
problems involved with a given reservation and then leave it to the states
themselves to determine whether they are going to object or not.
There is another interesting development relating to reservations; we call
them late reservations. As I mentioned earlier, there is a strict requirement
relating to the time for the lodgment of reservations under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In other words, reservations can be
lodged only at the time of ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or
signature. However, a practice has developed of certain states lodging
reservations even after this. We call these late reservations. The SecretaryGeneral has accommodated these late reservations and has accepted them in
deposit on the basis that none of the parties to the treaty would object to
them. The rationale for this approach is that it is an inherent right of sovereign
states to modify their treaty relations with the consent of each other. This
approach has also been discussed by the special rapporteur and he has lent
general endorsement to it.
There is a time limit within which objections to late reservations can be
lodged. It is now 12 months. It used to be 90 days, but that was a problem for
many federal states and for the European Community because the European
Community has a mechanism for coordinating its approach to legal issues,
specifically reservations, called the COJUR. There was a time when there were
15 members of the European Community; now there are 25. The original time
limit that was permitted for objections to late reservations of 90 days was
considered to be totally inadequate for the purposes of the European
Community. From memory, I would have thought that it would be totally
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inadequate for Australia also, if there were a need to consult the states. So,
after much consideration, the time limit was extended to 12 months.
Finally, I would like to touch upon another initiative undertaken by the
depository, the Secretary-General, since 2000. It is normally not the role of the
depository to encourage wider participation in the treaties deposited with
them. His role is much more limited. But since 2000 the Secretary-General has
been encouraging the members of the United Nations to undertake treaty
actions with regard to the treaties deposited with him. In other words, he has
actively encouraged wider participation. There are a number of reasons for
this. There were many treaties that were adopted with great enthusiasm but
which have remained far from universal participation. Similarly, there were
other treaties which were not even in force after many years. It was also
thought that encouraging wider participation would raise awareness relating
to the treaty framework, of which the Secretary-General was the custodian.
In 2000, the millennium summit year, he wrote to the heads of state and
government and invited them to undertake treaty actions when they visited
New York for the summit. The response to this invitation was overwhelming.
In fact, 274 treaty actions were undertaken in three days by 84 states, many of
them by heads of state and government. It was amazing to see the likes of
Chirac, Tony Blair, Schroder, the King of Jordon, the Prime Minister of India
and the Prime Minister of Japan all trooping in to sign, ratify or accede to
treaties deposited with the Secretary-General. The outcome of this initiative
was such a success that it has since been decided to have a treaty event
annually, in conjunction with the general debate of the General Assembly.
In 2001 we had a treaty event entitled ‘Focus 2001: Rights of Women and
Children’. In the same year, in response to the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington, there was a special treaty event focused on terrorism. In
2002 the theme was sustainable development; in 2003 it was treaties against
transnational organised crime and terrorism; in 2004 it was the protection of
civilians and in 2005, in conjunction with the 60th anniversary, the theme was
advancing the Millennium Development Goals. In 2005 there were 99 states
participating in the event, and the European Community. They undertook 265
treaty actions in three days. In 2006 the theme will be ‘crossing borders’. I
think that this is a theme relevant to Australia in more respects than one—it
relates to refugees, immigration et cetera.
CHAIR (Mr Kim Wilkie MP)—That was a very fascinating insight into the
United Nations treaty making process. Thank you very much for that. Would
you please join me in welcoming Dianne Yates MP, who is going to talk about
the treaty review process in New Zealand.
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Ms Dianne Yates MP—Thank you very much, Chairman Wilkie; thank you
very much, Dr Andrew Southcott, for inviting us here to take part in this
conference. I was totally distracted by Dr Kohona saying that people were
counting treaties. If Australians and New Zealanders are ‘ovi-moronic’ for
counting sheep in the middle of the night, what do you call someone who
counts treaties in the middle of the night? I will leave you to think about that.
First of all, I wish to introduce our team. I am the Chair of the Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee of the New Zealand Parliament.
We have here with us today Georgina te Heuheu, who is the deputy chair.
Georgina has also been Minister of Women’s Affairs and Minister for Courts
in the past. We also have with us today Keith Locke, and Keith has come up
to the front with me for a very good reason. Our Foreign Affairs Defence and
Trade Select Committee has nine members: four National, four Labour—we
are the government—and one Green, Keith. As you can see, we as the
government do not have a majority on that committee but, as the chair, I am
very good at negotiating, so Keith holds a very important position on the
committee. He also holds a very important position because he previously
had a private member’s bill on the treaty making process. Although the bill
was turned down by the House, his report has informed the treaty making
process, and many of the things that were in his bill, which had been talked
about for some time, have become part of our custom and practice. Keith will
certainly be happy to answer questions in that regard.
I also want to recognise that we have two people from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gerard van Bohemen and Lucy Richardson. We
also have our committee clerk, Svea Cunliffe-Steel. The interesting thing
about our select committee is that I was previously on with the Hon. David
Lange. I heard someone today—I think it was Richard Herr—say that
elections are rarely run on international issues. I think David Lange would
strongly disagree with you on that. In fact, the nuclear issue was still very
much alive in New Zealand at the last election.
On our committee we also have two former staff members of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, which is very interesting at times, and three former
ministers, so it is a very interesting committee, combining people with various
experience and interests. I was saying to someone at lunchtime that my first
experience in parliament on a select committee was on the Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Committee with the Hon. David Lange, who was then a
backbencher. The committee was involved in bringing the Antarctic treaty
into New Zealand law. David had a great deal of fun with that, entertaining
us with various aspects of what you could do with throwing chicken bones to
penguins, which of course could then get newcastle disease. But with the
occurrence of Asian flu and so on, it really was a very serious matter. As
members of the committee, we thought at the time that it was quite amusing,
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but then we realised how important such things are and how important it is,
as David said, for us to have night carts in Antarctica to take away all our
rubbish to be dumped way out to sea, somewhere near New Zealand!
The treaty making process is very important to New Zealand, not only
because of the history of how we came about our treating making process—
like most countries of the Commonwealth of Nations, through the
Westminster system—but also because one of New Zealand’s founding
documents is the Treaty of Waitangi. If ever we become a republic, that will
be a matter we will have to sort out with the British Crown. The three-clause
treaty is one that constantly pervades all legislation in New Zealand—and
very rightly so.
One of the points made at lunchtime was that of globalisation and that we
are increasingly becoming a smaller world. Within that smaller world we are
increasingly, with communications and trade, getting smaller and smaller.
Within that, we seem to have a greater need to more closely define ourselves.
It happened at the recent games in Melbourne. We had the United Kingdom
with three very distinct teams arguing when they counted up the medals
whether they should continue to have their distinct teams. Within
globalisation, we are constantly desperate to maintain our sovereignty and
our autonomy. I think that was particularly brought out, as I said, at
lunchtime.
We in New Zealand, as you will know, do not have a separate treaties
committee. This is one of the reforms that was discussed in 1999: should we
have a separate committee? I am thinking that when I go home I might revise
the idea again, because we have a private member’s bill that wants to reduce
the number of members from 120 to 99. One of the arguments we can put
forward is that perhaps we should have a separate treaties committee, and
then we would need more MPs to cover that. But, being a small nation, there
is a limit to the number of committees that you can have.
Our Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee looks at the treaties and
then delegates them to the appropriate subject committees. The committee I
previously chaired, on government administration, dealt with the sports and
drugs area. For the last two terms of parliament I have been on the Health
Select Committee. I particularly want to talk about what happened on that
committee with a bilateral treaty to do with therapeutic goods and Australia.
That was a very interesting process. Yes, we have bilateral treaties. Yes, we
have multilateral treaties. Yes, we have a series of criteria by which a treaty
actually gets sent to a committee. Yes, we have a treaties list—and I think it
was pointed out earlier this morning by Devika Hovell that having a list is not
necessarily consultation. But our committee is provided with a list from the
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of all treaties that we are involved in. If a treaty is
not referred to a committee, it can ask that that process happen.
What happened with the therapeutic goods treaty was that, first of all, there
was public consultation. We in New Zealand stress that right at the very
beginning: negotiation and public consultation—the more work you put in at
the front end, the less trouble you have further down the track. A public
discussion document went out in 2002. Then the Health Select Committee got
hold of this and said, ‘Let’s have an inquiry into this,’ reason being the
structure of the suggested joint agency, whether that joint agency was a good
idea and whether other options should not be pursued, but also the content,
which was about alternative health, which is becoming much more
fashionable, if I can use that word. There is the whole area of nutraceuticals
and how important they are becoming in our society, the whole issue of
intellectual property and the whole issue to do with Maori medicine and the
intellectual property around that and so on. So there were content issues and
there were process issues.
The inquiry by the Health Select Committee produced a report about two
inches thick. Very significantly, David McGee, the Clerk of the House, said
the committee turned it down. It was not quite as simple as that. The
committee said, ‘If we had a choice between a joint agency and a mutual
recognition regulatory authority, we would go for the mutual recognition one,
but we have 34 recommendations.’ Those 34 recommendations went to the
executive and to cabinet. In December, the month that New Zealand signed
up to the joint agency, the inquiry reported back to parliament. So while the
inquiry was going back to parliament we also agreed to this joint agency.
However, then came to the select committee the agreement and the national
interest analysis. So we have had the inquiry, which the committee initiated.
Then we got the agreement with the national interest analysis and we got the
response from the government to our inquiry report. The select committee
then reported back and said, ‘We are still not happy with it and we now have
10 recommendations.’ We whittled it down to 10. Those of you who are
involved in this matter know that there are still negotiations going on around
the detail.
In my former life in parliament I was on the Regulations Review Select
Committee. Anybody who has been on that committee knows that for some
people it is absolutely dead-boring and really picky, but it is also a
tremendously powerful committee because it looks at whether the rules are
consistent with the substantive legislation. We looked at this joint agency and
said, ‘Who is going to be making the New Zealand rules?’ because if the rules
are made by this treaty and they are made in Australia and we have to
enforce those rules in New Zealand—hello, hello, just a minute—will the
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regulations review agree with that and what is the process going to be in the
New Zealand regulations review committee?
We are at the point now where we are trying to iron out the finer details.
Most of it has to do with process rather than content, but there are still some
content issues that are being ironed out in the finer detail. It is a little bit like
salmon and Tasmania—big brother and smaller sister or whatever. We are
trying to work through the implementation details. But that was a very
interesting process when a select committee, through its inquiry, actually said,
‘No, we do not like it.’ Then what happens to that process? The ultimate
decision is with the executive.
The other issue that I wanted to talk about is a treaty that we have just
signed and which has just gone through our select committee. This is the P4
agreement, which is the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership between
New Zealand, Chile, Brunei, Darussalam and Singapore. We already had an
agreement with Singapore. It has now been extended to include Chile, Brunei
and Darussalam, and hopefully that kind of treaty will expand and there will
be further negotiations with other countries in that regard.
As I said, if you do the work up-front you have less trouble further on. The
process has been going on for years. I think it was at lunchtime that someone
said, ‘Take your time over these things.’ Since 2002 there have been
negotiations, there have been internal consultations within New Zealand,
there have been public papers put out, there have been seminars with
chambers of commerce, there has been consultation with Iwi groups and
Maori groups, and huge amounts of effort have gone into the national interest
analysis. That then came back to the select committee. We looked at it and we
did a report. After the national interest analysis came back to our select
committee, we called for submissions but we got only three—two against and
one for. We invited submissions, we advertised in the papers—we asked
everybody. People felt they had been consulted. They had already had their
say in the national interest analysis.
Then when it actually came to the legislation—we had to have a change in
New Zealand law to amend our tariff act to enable the final agreement on the
treaty—we had no submissions at all. When we called for submissions on the
NIA, we only got three. So we sent that through our select committee with no
submissions at all. I think there had been over 120 on the actual NIA itself. So
doing the work up-front means that it is easier further down the track.
I think there was comment this morning by Richard Herr about New
Zealand in 1997 saying, ‘We have negotiation acceptance and
implementation.’ I think the points that were made today about transparency,
scrutiny and accountability are very important. We also think that whole
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consultation process is extremely important. We have precedents in our law
about what constitutes consultation. I think what is also very important in an
increasingly smaller world is that public participation element and also
implementation. In the inquiry process, our select committee can have an
inquiry on how the implementation of any treaty is going along. We are
actually looking at formulating some terms of reference on an inquiry at the
moment to ask: ‘How is a certain treaty getting on? How is the
implementation going? Is it working in the way that we would have
expected?’
There are a couple of other points that I wish to comment on in relation to
New Zealand. All the details about how we go about our national interest
analysis are in the paper I have tabled. There was a comment on Keith Locke’s
bill. When it was reported back to the House, the select committee felt that
there should be a greater cost-benefit analysis in the national interest analysis,
although there are economic issues to be considered. Certainly on the
therapeutic goods issue, when the Health Select Committee did the inquiry
we called for a cost-benefit analysis. I know it is getting late on Friday night,
but I will point out quickly that in our paper, which you can read, I had
included the matters that are involved, including the national interest
analysis, which is part of the standing orders of New Zealand, and the
importance of the Pacific.
There was some discussion today—I think one of our members nudged me
when New Zealand was put in brackets by Greg Rose, but we don’t mind
that!—of the fact that one our concerns in New Zealand, and one of the things
we look at in terms of aid, is enabling our Pacific brothers and sisters to
comply with treaties. One of the things that our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
working on and that our committee is looking at is how we can best, without
being paternalistic, enable smaller nations that are closely allied to us to meet
with the requirements. When you have a very small nation that is the size of a
small high school, how can you comply with all these treaty requirements
when you are not going to spend all night counting sheep, treaties or
whatever it is? I think that Australia and New Zealand between them can
work out how best to work with the nation states of the Pacific to work on
treaty compliance.
There is a lot more in the paper, but I realise time is getting on. I did say to
Keith that, as he had worked on the legislation, he may like to make one or
two points and perhaps answer any questions.
Mr Keith Locke MP—It has been interesting listening to the discussion
today because it seems that the pressure for more openness, more
engagement with the treaty making process at an early stage is coming from
the states, who feel that, given that they have legislation that might be
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affected or changed, they want to be engaged early. In New Zealand, where
we do not have states and two levels of parliament—the Senate and the
House of Representatives—the pressure is coming from our proportional
system. The current government and the previous three governments have all
been minority governments. A minority government can sign up to a treaty
but that does not guarantee that the implementing legislation is going to get
through the parliament, which is sort of what has happened with the
therapeutic goods issue. It is wrong to say that, in the sense that it was not
really a division between the government and everyone else, because it was a
collective committee process, but I think the fact that we are operating in a
framework of minority governments tends to open up the process in a sense.
What happens in New Zealand with every bill that comes before the
parliament—and this really applies to every treaty that comes before the
government—is that they have to look at who supports it. I think one of the
things the Prime Minister asks when a bill comes before cabinet from a
minister is, ‘Which party outside of the government have you got supporting
this bill so that we can have a majority in parliament?’ That has been for every
bill over the last several years. There is a different composition of parties
depending on the bill.
One interesting treaty is the free trade and investment agreement between
New Zealand and Singapore. I think the debate on that was in about 2000-01.
In that parliament you had the Labour and the Alliance parties making up a
minority government—they did not have a majority on their own—working
with the Green Party in a confidence and supply agreement. On that
Singapore-New Zealand free trade agreement, of those three parties only
Labour supported it. The Alliance, even though it was in the government,
said: ‘We don’t support this agreement; we want to differentiate ourselves.’
They forced a debate in parliament on the treaty. There was not actually a
vote to approve the treaty, because we did not have that constitutional power.
My bill was for the parliamentary approval of treaties, but we had not and
still have not changed in that direction. But there was an indicative vote in
parliament on whether the parliament approved the Singapore-New Zealand
free trade treaty prior to ratification. The Labour Party knew it would get a
majority, because it knew the National Party, the other major party,
supported that agreement. So it was interesting that Labour’s two closest
allies in that parliament were dissenting on that particular treaty.
The other thing with the Singapore agreement is that the select committee
subsequently assessed how it was going—the trade balance and things like
that. So the select committee does have a role in looking at compliance. So
there has been a shift over the last few years. One of the results of my private
member’s bill, even though it failed in its principle purpose, was to produce a
lot more transparency, to use one of those three terms. Every six months the
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides the committee with a list of all
the treaties that are under negotiation and the stage they are at. The
committee can, if it chooses, engage with any of those treaties. We have asked
in the past for a report on how the negotiations for a free trade agreement
with China are going, and we received a little report from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. So there is more engagement, even though our
committee, and the parliament as a whole, does not have any right to approve
treaties.
Ms Dianne Yates MP—I also heard today someone talking about consensus
reports from the committee. We do not necessarily strive so hard for that but
it is important that, if there is a minority report, that goes in the report and
that goes back to the House and people are aware of the arguments that were
presented at the committee itself. We report on what happened at the
committee.
CHAIR (Mr Kim Wilkie MP)—Thank you very much for that. I think we
can have a couple of questions before we close.
Dr Michael Morgan—I want to pick up on the point that Professor Kellow
made about this concept of democratic deficit. We have touched on these
points a little over the last presentations, in particular in relation to
compliance or otherwise with treaties and covenants. I wonder when we are
thinking about democratic deficit whether it might be more productive to
think about the absence of national debates as a marker of the success or
otherwise of the treaty making process. Just to emphasise: power
configurations and the modalities of treaty making—to pick up the phrase
used earlier—vary greatly across the region. In some jurisdictions I think you
would find the vast majority of MPs, legislators, deputies and congresspeople
are not only unclear about the content of the treaties and the covenants with
which they are dealing but also about the international treaty regime itself.
They are also much less clear about what they can do about it, whether
wilfully or otherwise kept out of the processes of discussing international
covenants.
Dr Kohona’s presentation about 2005: Focus on the Millennium
Development Goals provides a useful example in the Pacific Islands in
particular, where there are now substantial lags between the agreements that
were signed onto and the actual implementation. There are a raft of treaties
where this is the case—CRC, CEDAW and so forth. It raises the question for
me: what advice would the collective wisdom of participants in this seminar
give to legislators who are supportive of a greater role in the processes of
treaty making or of opening up national dialogues about these issues, based
on the experience of developing these systems relatively recently in Australia
and elsewhere?
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Dr Palitha Kohona—With regard to ensuring compliance there are two
points that I would like to make. Compliance is not a major issue in many of
the developed democracies. Democracies tend to comply with their
international obligations quietly but meticulously. It is very rarely that you
find a country like the United States not complying with its international
obligations. When it does not, it becomes headline news—and that is why you
know it is not complying. If it were not complying on a daily basis then its
non-compliance would not make the news. But when it does not comply, or
people perceive it not to be complying, it hits the news. So I think that noncompliance is not a major problem with developed democracies. There may
be criticisms that you can level because you are dealing with international
standards, some of which are not absolutely specific, but I do not think I have
a problem with these countries.
The problem arises with some of the less-developed countries. In those
countries I suspect—and I am trying to be charitable—that the problem is not
a lack of will but a lack of resources. Many of these countries do not have the
mechanisms with which to give effect to their international obligations, and
they do not have the resources to develop those mechanisms. I think that that
is where countries like Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific region
can come in and play a positive role. They can help in capacity building and
in developing the local infrastructures et cetera. For example, you mentioned
CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. I think that, by and large, this convention can be given effect
in a comprehensive manner throughout the region if capacity for that purpose
can be effectively built up. I think that is where the problem lies.
CHAIR (Mr Kim Wilkie MP)—Thank you for that. Are there any other
questions?
Ms Dianne Yates MP—I would like to comment on that, because I think
that, partly, that is what today is about—having a 10-year review. It is like
today at lunchtime with the good guys and the not-so-good guys. You get
situations like UNROC with the children. We have a situation in New
Zealand in relation to the rights of paperboys and paper girls delivering
newspapers. The employment conditions of children delivering newspapers
do not actually conform with UNROC. We have had to work out how to deal
with that. It is not quite the same as a huge amount of exploitation of child
labour in some other places. I think you have answered the question very
carefully about how you work through that. As you have said, public outcry
is often the best way to do it when you cannot do it in other ways. It may tend
to be around those social issues. The issue of trade sanctions comes with that
as well. There are huge problems of compliance. As I have said today, one of
the reasons for signing up is so that you look as though you are a good guy.
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But, when you sign up, there is some element of commitment that you are
working towards that goal.
Mr Keith Locke MP—Could I put in a plug for multiparty democracy in
terms of generating the national debate you are talking about. Since we
moved to a proportional system in New Zealand, we have eight parties which
cover a wide spectrum of political views. That means that if there is dissent
with a treaty somewhere in the community it would tend to be reflected in
one of those parties and a national debate would more likely to be created,
perhaps, than in Australia, which has a less diverse political spectrum.
CHAIR (Mr Kim Wilkie MP)—Thanks for that. Are there any other
questions before we move on to the closing remarks? As there are no
questions, would you please join me in thanking our guests. Thanks very
much, everybody, for coming today. It has been a fascinating seminar.
Unfortunately, I could not be here for part of this morning. I am also on the
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, and today
we have been having an inquiry into air superiority in our region, because we
have to keep an eye on the Kiwis, you see! We are looking at what sort of
aircraft we are going to buy into the future. I have been doing some of that
this morning.
I have been a member of this committee since 1999, and it has been a
fascinating experience. As Dick said this morning, we have looked at many
different treaties over the years. With the first treaty I came into contact with,
when I walked into the room we were looking at the Defence agreement with
the Americans on Pine Gap—and for people who do not know, Australia and
America have a joint facility in the centre of Australia called Pine Gap. We
had a briefing at that meeting. Someone from Defence came in and put up a
projection on the wall of a helicopter flying over some domes in the desert.
The helicopter landed and people got out of it and walked through the
entrance of a building. A bus was seen coming through a gate, and the people
got out of the bus and walked through the entrance to a building. Then the
screen went blank and they said, ‘That’s it.’ We said, ‘Pardon?’ They said,
‘That’s the briefing about Pine Gap.’ I could not believe that we were
receiving so little information with which to make our decision as to whether
we should go down the path of the treaty. In fact, I remember that, at the end
of the day, one of the recommendations said something like, ‘Despite the fact
that we’ve received so little information regarding the operation of this
facility and that we could have obtained more information had we visited a
public library, we have found that we haven’t received any information that
says we shouldn’t ratify it; therefore, we should.’ Some of us thought that that
was not appropriate. That has been the case on both sides of the parliament
when we have looked at some of these treaties and not had proper
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information and scrutiny and we have made appropriate recommendations
accordingly.
No process is perfect, but we are working on it. That is partly why we have
had this 10-year review today—so that we can take away suggestions and
make improvements. I think that it has been a fascinating experience and one
that has been very worth while.
I would like to go through the list of speakers we have heard today and
comment briefly on what they have said. Thank you, Andrew, for your
introduction and for giving us a brief outline of how we operate things in
Australia. To Dick: what can we say? Everything from fun to boring—from
free trade agreements to Pine Gap and double taxation agreements, which are
quite boring, but, fortunately, we find that most of these double taxation
agreements are very similar so that we can usually move fairly quickly
through dealing with those particular treaties.
We heard from Devika Hovell, who has worked on ‘Ten Years of JSCOT: A
critical analysis’ . She covered transparency, scrutiny and democratic
accountability. I think that is very important. One thing I noticed while sitting
here, which you would not have seen, is that throughout the day people have
been coming through the public gallery, looking at what has been going on
and moving through. It is great to see that the public has been involved.
Neil Roberts MP spoke from a state perspective, covering the impact of
treaties on the states and territories and the need for early consultation, which
does not always occur. We have found that and it is something we need to
work on. I agree with the view that there needs to be early provision of a
national interest analysis. I have been quite critical in the past of the fact that
often the NIA only states what is good about a treaty and does not cover some
of the issues that we really need to consider because they might be
detrimental to the country if we go down that path. He also mentioned that
the Treaties Council needs to meet more. The fact that they have only met
once since 1997—and really they should meet every year—is something that I
think we need to take forward.
Petrice Judge, Anne Twomey and Associate Professor Richard Herr covered
various matters. I am sorry I was not there but I have heard that the
presentation was excellent. To Anne, who wrote the original report, Trick or
treaties, which led to this committee being established: ‘Well done, Anne;
thank you.’ They also came out with the view that there needs to be more
consultation with the states. The states also need to take more action
independently through their own parliaments to look at treaties. Often the
states do not do that; they forget the fact that they are operating separately,
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constitutionally, and that they really need to come up with some of those
things.
We heard from the speaker from the Tasmanian parliament and of course
the president of the council in Western Australia. Maybe we could take that
back to those people and others could take it back as well.
Then, at lunch, we moved on to Greg Sheridan. What a presentation Greg
gave—and I hope he is not watching here! It was fascinating. Greg made
mention of his dislikes—the bad treaties, and the risk to democratic states. He
spoke of having referendums to look at certain treaties—I am not sure how
we will go with that but it is something we could consider in the future,
Andrew—and of trade treaties being very good. One thing I have noticed
today, and that I noticed last night, is that we have talked about Tasmanian
salmon ad nauseam in this committee but I think we are going to have to go
down the path of discussing bananas more, because Greg talked about
bananas. We need to ensure that treaties are not supported just for the sake of
supporting them and I agree with that. Often we will get things coming past
our desk of which we think, ‘What are we doing this for?’ If it is just to make
ourselves look good internationally, then we need to consider that. Someone
mentioned Zimbabwe during Greg’s presentation, suggesting that if they had
oil they might get a little bit better treatment—but I did not want to go down
that path!
We then moved on to Mr Michael L’Estrange from DFAT, who talked about
DFAT’s position in regard to the treaty process. DFAT have been fantastic
over the years with us, because they have provided us with the advice that we
need. Michael also covered the history of the GATT, the WTO, general
multilateral agreements and free trade agreements and talked of where we are
going, the sorts of challenges we are going to be faced with in the future and
how we are going to undertake more consultation.
Professor Greg Rose spoke about treaties with regional neighbours. Greg,
that was great. It decided that our place in the universe is Oceania. We have to
deal with certain issues to do with the scope and categories of the different
treaties negotiated in our region. Professor Aynsley Kellow spoke on climate
change treaties. I could not agree more with some of the comments that were
made by him. I do not know whether the framework convention came before
our committee but certainly, with Kyoto, we went off and had an independent
inquiry and looked at certain problems covered there. That could possibly
lead to an inquiry by the committee into the AP6. I thought Aynsley made a
very important distinction—that is, whilst Russia is looking at hot air trading,
we in the House of Representatives think that that should be something we
should looked at with regard to the Senate; we reckon we could get quite a lot
of money if we were trading in hot air! The AP6 was covered—and the
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promise to look at the Asia-Pacific partnership. A question was asked about
the role of the committee in non-binding agreements such as climate change
agreements. Dr Palitha Kohona covered recent trends in treaty law from the
perspective of the UN Secretary-General. Thank you very much. That was a
fascinating insight into how the UN treats treaties. I also acknowledge Dianne
Yates and Keith Locke from the New Zealand Parliament. I had the pleasure
of going to New Zealand and looking at the treaty making process you have
over there and was very impressed. Thank you very much for your
presentation. Please join me in thanking our presenters.
It is also fitting that we take the opportunity today to acknowledge the
work of the sponsoring departments who not only negotiate the treaties but
prepare the national interest analysis, which is fundamental to the work of the
committee, and who appear as witnesses before the committee. They often
present the reports and then come and face a grilling from us. I also
acknowledge the work of the treaties secretariat, headed up by Jonathan
Thwaites, particularly for the efforts in coordinating the tabling of proposed
treaty actions which stand referred to the committee. We thanked Gillian
Gould last night—and rightfully so—but I would like to mention some others
as well. I make special mention of Ruth Blunden. Ruth is one of the founding
members of the secretariat. Thanks very much, Ruth, for all your work; it is
great to see you here today.
I would like to thank the seminar coordinator, Serica Mackay, ably assisted
by Heidi Luschtinetz and Stephanie Mikac, and others members of the
secretariat: Janet Holmes, Clare James, Gaye Milner and Peter Banson. Thank
you. Preparations for today have also extended beyond the secretariat. In
particular, we thank Lisa McDonald for designing the program booklet and
Matt Johnson and Andy Reinpacher for the printing. I say to those guys: well
done. We have also received assistance from our Liaison and Projects Office,
the Department of the Senate and the Department of Parliamentary Services.
We thank everybody who has contributed to the success of the seminar, not
least the Clerk, Ian Harris, and his enthusiastic support for the JSCOT
endeavour. Thank you all for coming. Have a safe trip home and happy treaty
processing in the future. Thank you.
Committee adjourned at 4.18 pm
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